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[W]e shall make the general claim that in the combination of these
two types of rule there lies . . . 'the key to the science of jurisprudence.'**
A science is any discipline in which the fool of this generation can
go beyond the point reached by the genius of the last generation.***
I.

INTRODUCTION:
JURISPRUDENTIAL

THE NEED FOR A
METATHEORY

Jurisprudence is a tantalizing concern. The fundamental importance of its issues and subject matter entices scholars; but agreement
on these fundamental matters, like the legendary fruits hanging over
Tantalus, always eludes jurisprudents. A law student, who did not
enjoy the role of Tantalus, recently offered a blunt characterization
of this problem: "One man's theory is another man's bullshit."
Despite pages and pages of considerably more polite discourse among
jurisprudents, the student's comment still is uncomfortably close to
the truth.
Underlying the fruitless aspect of this debate is the lack of a
jurisprudential "metatheory" or "theory of theory," which would be
addressed to three interrelated methodological tasks:
First, the selection of theoretical tasks or functions, i.e., the
determination of the questions the science and its theory should
consider.
Second, the construction of theories which are logically consistent, unambiguous, and "testable" in terms of objective criteria.
Third, the evaluation of theories to determine the degree to which
their tasks are accomplished and to compare conflicting theories.
With such a metatheory it would be possible, for example, to identify
areas of actual disagreement as opposed to perceived disagreement
and to compare theories which are in conflict by some criteria of
"validity."
**
*

H. L A.
M.

HART,

GLUCKMAN,

THE

CONCEPT OF

LAW 79 (1961).

POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL

IN

TRIBAL

SOcIETY 60 (1965).
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Thus, metatheory could play an important role in jurisprudence;
however, with a few notable exceptions,' the development of metatheory has generally been ignored. For example, jurisprudence has:
(1) Relied largely on "tradition" to. define its theoretical
tasks and neglected the development of a methodology for consciously selecting issues which might be more "fruitful."
(2) Relied almost exclusively on verbal methodology to
construct models even though such models are more ambiguous
than those expressed in terms of mathematics or symbolic logic.2
(3) Shown a remarkable disdain for the problem of "testing" models in terms of any criteria other than logical consistency or support from the traditional. "authorities" in the
field, such as Aquinas and Austin.
The result of this approach has been the problem of "one man's
theory . . . ." mentioned above. The time has come to shift to a new
approach and to focus on the conscious development of a jurisprudential metatheory.
This article will make specific proposals for such a development
and demonstrate the usefulness of metatheory in terms of constructing
and comparing theories. The discussion begins with a summary of
a proposed metatheoretical perspective. This perspective is then illustrated by examining the theory of law presented by H.L.A. Hart in
The Concept of Law.- Hart's book has been chosen for analysis for
several reasons. First, it is relatively well known. Second, it has
already been subjected to a considerable amount of conventional
jurisprudential analysis.' Third, Hart explicitly discusses some metatheoretical issues both in The Concept of Law's and in other writings."
Finally, it presents a modern theory of law that is: (1) unusually
well developed in that it discusses not merely the elements of law
1. See, e.g., Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70
LAW Q. REV. 37 (1954); Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law,
44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362 (1971); Shubert, Behavioral Jurisprudence, 2 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 407 (1968); cf., e.g., F. NORTHRUP, THE ComL.xT OF LEGAL AN) ETHICAL
EXPERIENCE (1959).
2. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text infra.
3. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) [hereinafter HART, CONCEPT].
For a detailed, though dated, bibliography of other writings by Hart, see Pannam,

Professor Hart and Analytical Jurisprudence, 16 J. LEeAL ED. 379, 403 (1964).
4. See, e.g., 13 INDEX TO LEGAL PERIODICALs 884.
5. HART, CONCEPT 1-17, 210-11.
6. E.g., Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW Q. REv. 37

(1954).
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but also their interrelationships; (2) remarkably unambiguous for
a verbal model; and (3) relatively free of logical inconsistencies.
The discussion of Hart's model will be divided into two parts: the
model will be presented in summary form and then subjected to a
critical analysis. At several points in this latter discussion conventional
jurisprudential criticism will be considered. However, the purpose of
this article is not to present a complete or exhaustive account of this
type of criticism. Rather the concern is to demonstrate the proposed
metatheoretical approach' by analyzing Hart's model in depth and
by occasionally contrasting this approach with conventional theoretical criticism. This concern will be developed further in the concluding section of the' article, which presents a sketch of a possible
"model of jurisprudence."'
II.

A.

PROPOSiD METATHEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Focus of Proposed Perspective
The metatheoretical perspective proposed in this article focuses

on the testing and comparison of theories. Thus, the primary concern is with two questions:
First, what is a "good" or "valid" theory?
Second, given two theories, do they conflict? If so, which

of the theories is "better" or more "valid"?
The section that follows suggests that the basic answers to these
questions are that a '"good" theory is a theory that does what you
want it to do, and that a "better" theory is one that does what you
want it to do better than another theory. In short, the proposed test is
pragmatic or functional. Before developing this test, however, it will
be helpful not only to discuss why this focus has been selected but
also to indicate themetatheoretical tasks which are not developed in
this article.
The evaluation of theoiies isemphasized because if it were possible to compare theories and ,thus reject some (or part) of them, then
jurisprudents could focus on the development of the "better" theories.
In this way jurisprudents could begin the co-operative development
of legal theories that ou.ld be compared, tested, refined, and improved.
The result, hopefully,.would :be a cumulative process in which our
awareness of the place of "law" in the world around us would be
gradually improved. There would still be a necessary role for dialetic
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and debate, but such dispute would occur within a framework where
7
friction results in less heat and more light.

Given this focus, the first task of metatheory - the selection
of issues - is not developed in any detail in this article. However,
the selection of issues should be made with the tasks of testing and
comparison in mind. If it is impossible to test or compare conflicting
theories which are addressed to a specific issue, then the suitability of
the issue itself should be reconsidered. It might be that, even after
such reflection on the issue, a problem involving untestable theories
will still be considered appropriate for theoretical analysis. 8 If this
is the case, then the theorist should preface his theory with the
rationale for constructing a theory which is untestable and incapable
of comparison and which, therefore, may not add to the cumulative
development of legal theory. Theoretical evaluation is also relevant
to the selection of issues in another way. As indicated in the next
section, some theoretical tasks rank "higher" than others. Consequently, jurisprudents should attempt to undertake the higher tasks
rather than the lower to the extent this is possible.
Similarly, the second task of metatheory - construction of
theories - is not developed in detail. The point to be emphasized
here is that jurisprudents should reduce their reliance on verbal
models. This reliance has hindered the development of jurisprudence
because the inherent ambiguity of language has frequently resulted
in a characteristic pattern of irrelevant, wasteful non-debate: "X
meant A, B, C"; "No, he meant A, B, D"; "You are both wrong,
X really meant A, C, D." With such a situation it is usually impossible' to determine what X meant, much less whether his point was
"valid." Moreover, the construction and analysis of such verbal
7. Cf., Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1296 (1965).
8. For examples of such an approach to the "untestable," but important, topic
of justice, see C. FmE, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES (1970) and J. RAWLS, A THEORY
This topic is inherently untestable in terms of the criteria
OF JUSTICE (1971).
developed in this article because the focus of justice is on the "ought" rather than
the "is," and the criteria proposed in this article rely on the empirical world of the
"is" as the arbiter between conflicting theories. See discussion of empiricism in note 18
and accompanying text infra. Although the task is beyond the scope of this article,
it should be possible to develop a metatheoretic perspective on theories of justice.
For example, ambiguity can be reduced by using short propositional statements like
those used in formalizing Hart's Model and as used in N. BOWIE, TOWARDS A NEW
THEORY OF DISTRIEUTIVE JUSTICE (1971). Logical consistency requirements can be
imposed by using the concept of "coherence" - a coherent theory is one that is
relatively clear, consistent, and not subject to logically consistent but substantively
offensive counter examples. Id. at 14; RAWLS, supra at 46-53; Feinberg, Justice,
Fairness and Rationality, 81 YALE L.J. 1004, 1018-21 (1972). Moreover, some
aspects of justice can be examined empirically, as is indicated in note 18 infra.
9. For an example of such a problem, see note 220 infra.
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models tend to focus on the subjective "meaning" of words rather
than on objective events which can be observed. Thus, verbal models
are often so "untestable" that they hinder advancement beyond the
point of "one man's theory .... "
Alternative approaches to the use of verbal models include
mathematical models"0 and models relying on symbolic logic." Where
these tools of theory construction are inappropriate, 2 then the modelbuilding process should rely on explicit definition and the use of short,
relatively unambiguous propositions like those used in the following
analysis of Hart's model of law. It should be stressed that these
approaches are not necessarily a more "accurate" representation of
"reality" than conventional verbal models expressed in prose discussion form; rather, their strength lies in their increased clarity and
explicitness.'"
B.

Criteria for Evaluating Theories

One test for evaluating a theory is its "internal consistency." A
theory which is logically inconsistent is obviously suspect. Another
criterion is a functional measure of the theory - what should the
theory do and how well does it do it. Among the general functions
10. APPENDIX 2 contains a mathematical or computerized version of part of
Hart's model. There are numerous other examples of mathematical models in the
social sciences. E.g., Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1974) (economic model of legal
process); Shinnar & Shinnar, The Effects of the Criminal Justice System on the
Control of Crime: A Quantitative Approach, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 581 (1975)
(sociological model of legal process).
11. E.g., Allen, Formalizing Hohfeldian Analysis to Clarify the Multiple Senses
of "Legal Right": A Powerful Lens for the Electronic Age, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 428
(1974).
12. For a discussion of their inapplicability to the present article, see discussion
in note 34 infra.
13. Jay Forrester makes this point in INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS § 4.7 (1961):
A verbal model and a mathematical model are close kin. Both are abstract
descriptions of the real system. The mathematical model is the more orderly;
it tends to dispel the hazy inconsistencies that can exist in a verbal description.
The mathematical model is more "precise." By precise is meant "specific,"
"sharply defined," and "not vague." The mathematical model is not necessarily
more "accurate" than the verbal model, where by accuracy we mean the degree
of correspondence to the real world. A mathematical model could "precisely"
represent our verbal description and yet be totally "inaccurate."
Much of the value of the mathematical model comes from its "precision"
and not from its "accuracy." The act of constructing a mathematical model
enforces precision. It requires a specific statement of what we mean. Constructing
a model implies nothing one way or the other about the accuracy of what is
being precisely stated.

Id. at 57.
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of theories or models are:"4 (1) classification; (2) prediction; and
(3) advancement of technological control of phenomena. And these
functions can be divided even further. For example, prediction could
refer to prediction of patterns of events rather than of specific events,' 5
or to the mere occurrence of a specific event rather than to the
measurement of the amount or degree of such event."6
The most obvious way that functionalism can provide objective
tests of validity is the following:
If one desires prediction from the theory and the theory can
only classify, then the theory is inadequate from a functional
point of view. If one desires prediction of X, and the theory
predicts Y, then the theory is inadequate even though it predicts.
Validity in this scheme is relative: it is determined by the function
one selects. For example, a theory which predicts Y but not X is
valid for the purpose of predicting Y and invalid for predicting X.
Thus, a straightforward functionalism can serve as a criterion of the
relative validity of theories.
Functionalism of this sort can take us only so far, however, as
an initial problem exists in determining whether a function has been
performed "adequately." A predictive model which is correct 90%
of the time would be adequate for some purposes, but not for others.
Adequacy in this sense is a particular problem with classification
models: although such models operate on the identification of similarities and dissimilarities, objects in the real world are only similar
and dissimilar to a degree. Consequently, a classification model is
adequate only if it is able to distinguish between degrees of similarity/
dissimilarity with precision sufficient for the purposes involved. Thus,
a legal theoretician not only must consider the function to be performed by a theory but also must develop some criterion of adequacy
of satisfaction of that function.
14. The list in the text excludes:
(1) The persuasive function of theories of law. For example, a natural-law
theory might attempt to persuade persons to refuse allegiance to a particular
legal system. This function has been omitted because it overlaps with the
technological control function; i.e., to "persuade" persons to revolt is to control
that aspect of their behavior.
(2) The "explanatory" function of theories. This function is mentioned by
HART, CONCEPT 79; however, terms like "explanation," "elucidation" and "understanding" are so ambiguous that they have not been used. Instead, these tasks
have been more explicitly defined in the text as classification, prediction, etc.
See further discussion in note 24 infra.
15. See, e.g., J. FommsEvR, INUSnuAI DYNAMICS § 13.7, at 123-28 (1961).
16. See id. at 128-29; K. DEUTSCH, THE NEavs oF GovENMENT 9-10 (1966).
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Another problem arises where one wants to predict behavior
X, and two theories - both internally consistent - predict that
behavior "adequately." How does one choose between the two
theories? At this point, it becomes necessary to "rank" the functions
of theory listed above according to the degree to which each "correlates" with the real world. For example, classification correlates
i.e., organizes -

if it "fits," -

the empirical data in a manner such

that an objective observer would agree with the classifier. Prediction
must have an even greater degree of correlation because it both
identifies an event as X and predicts when X will occur. Technological control has a threefold correlation: (1) identification of X; (2)
prediction of X; and (3) manipulation of X. Thus, the functions of
theories can be ranked as follows:
(1) Classification. This is the lowest functional ranking.
(2) Prediction. This function could be subdivided further.
For example, prediction of mere events would rank lower than
prediction of a measurable degree of an event, e.g., "the chair will
move" ranks below "the chair will move in X direction with Y
velocity."
(3) Technological control. This function could also be internally ranked. For example, control of a mere event ranks lower
than control of degree of event.
With this ranking system it is possible to compare two predictive
theories and rate one as superidr if it is the only one that can be used
to control events. Moreover, as indicated above,17 this ranking is
relevant not only to the evaluation of theories but also to the selection
of theoretical issues.
This particular ranking system is proposed because the empirical
world is the only available standard for evaluating most legal theories."8
17. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
18. This constitutes a considerable commitment to empiricism as an epistemological
basis. See C. CHURCHMAN, THE DESIGN OF INQUIRING SYSTEMS (1971); L.
KOLAKOWSKI,

OF REASON: A HISTORY OF POSITIVIST THOUGHT
Therefore, the criteria
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).

THE ALIENATION

(1968); cf. R.

proposed in the text are subject to the shortcomings of this epistemology. See id.
For example, as explained in note 8 and the accompanying text supra, theories
of "justice" would be difficult to evaluate. Nevertheless, specific issues involving

"justice" are subject to some empirical analysis. See G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR:
ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS, 72-78, 232-77 (1961); G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE:
A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION (1966); P. SELZNIcK, LAW, SOCIETY AND
INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969). But the difficulties involved in such empirical studies
are enormous. For example, an apparently straightforward task like analyzing the
distribution of income and wealth in a society can be extremely difficult. See, e.g., A.
PEACOCK, INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1954); J. Rodgers, Explaining
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Without such an ultimate impersonal standard, jurisprudence can
never progress beyond the present stage of "one man's theory

...

,

With such a ranking system it becomes possible to compare theories
not only in terms of the degree to which they accomplish a particular
function, but also in terms of whether one particular function is
"better" than another.
In addition to the functional criterion and the ranking system
proposed above, there are two other criteria for evaluating theories or
models:
(1) Efficiency. Learning, studying, "testing," and "applying" models takes time. Therefore, a simple model which fulfills
a function and requires less time in these processes is superior.
(2) Originality. Does the model tell us something that was
not "obvious" beforehand?
These criteria are derived from the role that theories play in processing information about the world. The first test, efficiency, compares
the amount of useful information gained from the model to the cost of
utilizing the model. The second test focuses on the new information
Redistribution, in RFDiSTRIBUTION THROUGH PUBLIC CHOICE (H. Hochman & G.
Peterson eds. 1974).
A further discussion of the limits of this epistemological framework is

contained in the latter part of note 19 infra.
19. The textual statement is perhaps overbroad because a cultural standard
could be used for evaluating theories from the perspective of that culture. Such
cultural standards are indicated, for example:
(1) Where jurisprudents support a particular position by reference to the writings
of other theorists whose works form part of the cultural system. For an
example of such a cultural reference, see notes 140-41 and accompanying text
infra.
(2) Where those who decide legal issues use some cultural criteria of a valid
legal theory. Hart's concept of the "rule of recognition" reflects such a
cultural standard. For a discussion of this concept, see text accompanying
notes 77-85 and 201-06 infra.
Given such a cultural standard, it might be possible for theorists within that culture
to get beyond the problem of "one man's theory. . .

."

However, such a standard

is subject to two criticisms: first, it is clearly limited to a particular culture; and
second, it is often so vague that opposing theories can claim cultural support. Hart
discusses such vagueness in the rule of recognition in HART, CONCEPT 144-50.
The same criticisms can be leveled at empiricism. See authorities cited in
paragraph one of note 18 supra. Epistemological perspectives are cultural to a
considerable degree and the "real world" is defined in part by cultural conceptions.
Moreover, "facts" are often so ambiguous that no agreement is possible. It might
be more accurate, therefore, to rephrase the text in terms of an argument that an
increased emphasis on empirically "testable" theories will make possible a greater
degree of agreement and make it possible to advance considerably beyond the present
stage of "one man's theory. ..." or "one culture's theory....
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gained from the theory. These additional criteria can be combined
with the above system as "tie-breakers": for example, if two models
are both adequately predictive, then the more efficient, "simpler" model
is superior.
With this metatheoretical framework in mind, it is now possible to
evaluate Hart's model of law. It should be remembered that this
analysis has several objectives. The primary purpose is to develop
and demonstrate the use of the proposed metatheoretical perspective.
In addition, there is the negative task of pointing out deficiencies in
Hart's theory. Finally, there is the complementary goal of indicating
his theoretical strengths which can be used for further theoretical
development in the co-operative venture of a "legal science."

III.

ANALYSIS OF HART'S MODEL OF LAW FROM THE
PROPOSED METATHEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

A.

Hart's Theoretical Strategy

With the metatheoretical perspective developed above, it is possible to consider an individual jurisprudent's particular theoretical
strategy. The concept of a theoretical strategy refers to the particular
answer given to the three basic questions: First, what do you expect
your theory to do? Second, what methodology do you use in constructing the theory? Third, how do you evaluate your theory to
determine if it does what you want it to do? Unfortunately, Hart,
like most jurisprudents, generally neglects these questions in The
Concept of Law. 0 Thus, his theoretical perspective must be gleaned
implicitly from an overall reading of his book.
Hart's answer to the first question in theory construction is that
his model is designed "to isolate and characterize a central set of
elements which form a common part of the answer" 21 to the following
jurisprudential issues:
How does law differ from and how is it related to orders
backed by threats? How does legal obligation differ from, and
how is it related to, moral obligation? What are rules and to
what extent is law an affair of rules ?22
20. Hart does occasionally discuss metatheory, see notes 5-6 and accompanying
text supra, but such discussions are exceptions to a general pattern of neglect See
notes 25 & 33 infra.
21. HART, CONCEPT 16.

22. Id. at 13.
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The purpose of the book
is not to provide a definition of law, in the sense of a rule by
reference to which the correctness of the use of the word can
be tested; it is to advance legal theory by providing an improved
analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system
and a better understanding of the resemblances and differences
between law, coercion, and morality, as types of social phenomena.
The set of elements identified in the course of the . . . discussion . . . serve this purpose . . . . It is for this reason that they

are treated as the central elements in the concept of law and of
prime importance in its elucidation.2"
Thus, Hart's model is designed to classify, i.e., to identify and
organize the elements of the "real" world into categories such as
"orders backed by threats," "rules," "morals," and "municipal legal
systems." The result of such a classification process will be an increased
understanding ("elucidation") of the elements and their relationship.

24

The tasks of a model often dictate the third theoretical consideration - the evaluation of the model. Therefore, this will be discussed
next and the methodology of construction will be discussed afterward.
Hart apparently feels that his model "organizes" data well because
it establishes clearly delineated conceptual boxes - for example, a
box labelled "law" which is different from the box labelled "orders
backed by threats" - and provides a guide for determining what bit
of the world goes into each box. However, a classification model is
not very useful to a discipline until it gains widespread acceptance
for only then can it provide a framework for intellectual discussion
and experimentation. For example, Darwin's ability to develop his
theory of natural selection was based in part on the existence of a
well accepted classification scheme of plants and animals. Likewise,
the success of Hart's model depends largely on its acceptance as an
organizational or classification device. Without such approval, it is
only "one man's theory .

...

Achieving this acceptance requires some commonly acknowledged
criterion of similarity and dissimilarity, which will determine the
structure of the classification model. Nonetheless, even though Hart
proposes a scheme of classifying "elements" based on similarities
23. Id. at 17.
24. Hart often refers to tasks such as elucidation and understanding, but these
concepts are too vague to be used as a definition of purpose. See discussion in note 14

supra. Therefore, the more explicit task of classification has been used to refer to
Hart's purpose since this is a more precise term for what he is doing.
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and dissimilarities, he does not offer any criterion for determining
"likeness." 2 5 Consequently, if another jurisprudent thinks that legal
rules are sufficiently "like" morality that it is possible to refer to a
"morality of law," 2 6 Hart cannot offer an objective criticism. He
can only say that from his personal perspective they are not sufficiently alike.
This deficiency is perhaps best illustrated by examining Hart's
criticisms of other models. He frequently criticizes some models as
' 28
containing "too few" elements 7 and others as containing "too many.
Yet he never provides a measure of "too many" or "too few." He
suggests that too few "distorts" reality2 9 and that too many "confuses"
analysis," ° but he never tells how we know the mix is "just right."
Nevertheless, despite this lack of a criterion of adequacy, Hart asserts
that his model is the "key to the science of jurisprudence."' 1 This
statement clearly claims too much ;32 it does not require extended
25. See HART, CONCEPT 155:
[Tlhough 'Treat like cases alike and different cases differently' is a central
element in the idea of justice, it is by itself incomplete and, until supplemented,
cannot afford any determinate guide to conduct. This is so because any set of
human beings will resemble each other in some respects and differ from each
other in others and, until it is established what resemblance and differences are
relevant, 'Treat like cases alike' must remain an empty form. To fill it we must
know when, for the purposes in hand, cases are to be regarded as alike and what
differences are relevant.
Unfortunately, Hart does not apply this same analysis to his own classification
scheme. See notes 27-30, 188-93 and accompanying text infra.
26. E.g., L. FULLER, THE MORALITY Or LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
27. See, HART, CONCEPT 18, 35, 208-09. A model with fewer elements has a
less restrictive or a wider view of what phenomena are included. For example, the
following model of X says that X has two elements:
X is an animal:
(1) with four legs, and
(2) fur.
This is less restrictive (or broader) than a model which says that X has 3 elements:
X is an animal:
(1) with four legs,
(2) fur, and
(3) weighs over 20 pounds.
The former is less restrictive because more phenomena would be included as
examples of the general model.
28. Id. at 35, 152-53, 205-07. See note 27 supra.
29. HART, CONCEPT 18-19.
30. Id. at 205-07.
31. Id. at 79.
32. Hart himself has since rephrased his contribution in more modest terms,
"I regarded my aim in the Concept of Low as complementary to and in no way
exclusive of [other approaches] .... " Hart, Book Review, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1281,
1291 (1965).
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discussion to show that many problems still puzzle jurisprudents and
that these problems cannot be solved with Hart's key. The point to
be made from a metatheoretic perspective is that Hart's methodology
of model construction is flawed from the beginning because he never
discusses the problem of a criterion of validity. The model may,
nevertheless, be valid or useful in terms of some criterion that we
might provide.
In approaching the second task of theoretical strategy, Hart
adopts the usual approach of jurisprudents and uses an entirely
verbal methodology of theory construction."3
In order to avoid the problems of ambiguity inherent in verbal
models, the first stage in the metatheoretic analysis of Hart's model
will be to translate his model into short, relatively unambiguous
propositional statements.3 4 This translation process - referred to
as "formalizing" the model - will be effected in stages with textual
analysis interspersed among "formal" statements. (Since the various
propositions will be referred to by number throughout the article, a
complete formalization with no textual discussion is included as
APPENDIX 1.) This formalization process is divided into two parts.
The first part develops Hart's underlying models of man and society.
33. Hart shows an awareness of the limits of language in his analysis of the
"open-textured" quality of rules. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text infra.
Unfortunately, however, he does not adopt a less "open-textured" method of theory
construction.
34. Such a translation process, of course, runs the risk of wasteful debate along
the lines mentioned previously, i.e., I am stating that Hart's model is A, B, C;
another person might assert that he said A, B, D. See note 220 infra. However,
this risk is inevitable since Hart's model is verbal. The emphasis here is not on
presenting a condensation of Hart. Instead, the thrust of this article is to point
out the need for a jurisprudential metatheory and to make some proposals for such
a theory. Thus, if my translation is challenged, the fault lies primarily with Hart - his
verbal model is too ambiguous and he needs to adopt a different strategy of theory
construction. Agreement by the reader on this point is more important than
agreement on my "translation" of Hart. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
Even my translations are, of course, ambiguous since they are also verbal.
However, the use of propositional statements like those in the text is a good procedure
for constructing models which are less ambiguous than verbal models in discussion
form. It is possible to go even further in eliminating ambiguity. E.g., Allen,
Formalizing Hohfeldian Analysis to Clarify the Multiple Senses of "Legal Right":
A Powerful Lens for the Electronic Age, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 428 (1974). However,
such an extreme approach has not been used because the underlying ambiguities in
Hart limit translation to such precise language and because the potential audience
of this article would be considerably reduced. Moreover, there are a number of
writers who use propositional statements as the methodology for the initial stages
of developing models of man, society, and/or law. E.g., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
OF LAW (D. Black & M. Mileski eds. 1974); G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A
THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 24-42 (1966).
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The second part formalizes his model of law. This division is necessitated by the fact that these underlying models are often testable
where his model of law is not. In this way an objective criterion of
theoretical validity can be used in the later critical analysis of the
model of law.
B.

Formalization of Hart's Models
1. Implicit Models of Man and Society

For
Hart regards law as an "instrument of social control."
this reason his theory of law is based on models of man and of society."
Obviously, the "validity ' 3 7 of these underlying models is crucial to
the "validity" of his model of law. Yet Hart leaves these models
largely at an implicit level. It will be helpful, therefore, to begin
the analysis of his model with an explicit discussion of these underlying models.
Hart's model of man includes the following elements:
(M-1) Man is purposive or goal-oriented. 8
(a) Specific goals vary from individual to individual
and from time to time, but all men are goal-oriented.
(b) Virtually all men have the goal of survival which
is an equilibrium state called "life."3 9
40
(c) There are no other goals common to nearly all men.
HART, CONCEPT 121.
36. Hart states that:
[I]t is a truth of some importance that for the adequate description not only of
law but of many other social institutions, a place must be reserved, besides

35.

definitions and ordinary statements of fact, for a third category of statements:
those the truth of which is contingent on human beings and the world they live
in retaining the salient characteristics which they have.
HART, CONCEPT

195.

37. "Validity" is used broadly in the text to refer to validity in terms of one
or more of the criteria developed in the previous section. See § II(B) of this article.

It should be remembered throughout that "validity" is an extremely relative term,

because it depends on:
(a) the function involved;
(b) the criteria of satisfaction of that function;
(c) the relative ranking of the functions; and
(d) the general tests of internal logical consistency, simplicity, and originality.
The concept of validity is further discussed below in analyzing Hart's models. See
notes 122-26 and accompanying text infra.
38. Although never explicitly stated, this aspect of human nature is implicit in
many of Hart's statements. See HART, CONCEPT 185-90.
39. Id. at 187-88.
40. Id. This statement is implicit in Hart's comments concerning the arguable
weaknesses of positions like those taken by Aristotle and Aquinas. For a discussion
indicating that the proposition in the text above may be a slight distortion of Hart's
position, see note 132 infra. As indicated in that footnote the problems in developing
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(M-2) Man is "rational" or "efficient" (more or less). 41
(M-3) Men are relatively equal42 in that they have common
limits on:
43
(a) their ability to protect themselves,
4
(b) their inclination to act altruistically,"
(c) their ability to process information, 5
(d) their longevity, 46
(e) the material resources available to them for accomplishing goals, 4 7 and
48
(f) their physical abilities.
(M-4) Man is uniquely capable of recognizing from an internal
49
perspective the "binding" nature of certain standards.
Building on this model of man, Hart has an implicit model of
society:
Social effort is more "efficient" ' than individual effort.
(S-2) Dynamic societies are more "efficient" than static societies. 51
(S-3) Societies with a division or specialization of labor are
more "efficient" than societies where all men do the same
work.52 Therefore, societies with "legal specialists"
(S-1)

Hart's model of man are caused by his limited and ambiguous treatment of the topic.
For a general discussion of this problem, see note 34 supra.
41. Rationality, like purposiveness, is implicit throughout Hart's discussion. See
HART, CONCEPT 185-89.
42. Id. at 190-92.
43. Id. at 190.
44. Id. at 191-92, 193.
45. Id. at 121-32. These limitations take various forms including the limitations
of language, id., limits on ability to determine facts, id. at 125, and limits on ability
to anticipate future circumstances. Id.
46. Id. at 52-54.
47. Id. at 192-93.
48. Id. at 190-91, 194.
49. Id. at 55-57, 86-88, 96, 134-37.
50. "Efficiency" refers to ability to increase goal satisfaction per unit of input.
Apparently, Hart assumes that, given man's weaknesses (Proposition M-3), cooperative social effort is more likely to provide efficient goal satisfaction. See id.
at 189.
51. Hart contrasts a "dynamic" society which is characterized by a relatively
high rate of change, with a "static" society which is characterized by a relatively
low rate of change. Hart does not develop the concepts any further than this rough
characterization. See id. at 90-96. The superiority of dynamic societies is implicit
in Hart; for example, societies which are static are referred to as "defective." Id.
52. HART, CONCEPT 192-93.
k.
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("officials") are more "efficient" than societies without
"officials." 53
(S-4) Societies require a certain minimum level of "order" or
co-ordination. 4
Many aspects of Hart's model of law are based on these models
of man and society. This relationship will be developed in the following section. Later in this article Hart's models of man and society
will be examined in terms of metatheoretical criteria of "validity." In
this way, those parts of Hart's model of law which rest on the models
of man and society can also be measured by these criteria.
2. The Model of Law

-

Law as Rules

Hart unequivocally states that law consists of rules. 5 In reaching this conclusion he spends considerable time criticizing the
shortcomings of other theories. This criticism will be referred to in
53. Id. at 92-96. The concept of "official" would appear to include, at least,
legislators, judges, and police. However, Hart never defines "official." See notes
92, 204 infra; APPENDIX 2 infra.
One possible definition might be that an "official" is one who exercises
power pursuant to a secondary rule. However, Hart distinguishes elsewhere between
the official and private exercise of powers:
The ordinary citizen manifests his acceptance largely by acquiescence in the
results of these official operations. He keeps the law which is made and identified
in this way, and also makes claims and exercises powers conferred by it.
HART, CONCEPT 60 (emphasis added); see id. at 40, 85, 95; cf. id. at 20-21, 38,
109-14. Thus, "official" is not adequately defined as one who exercises secondary
power; something more is involved.
Two other possible definitions are suggested by various parts of Hart's
discussion. First, Hart at times appears to define "official" by reference to the degree
of centralization of power. See id. at 95, 211-15, 244. For further discussion of
this approach see note 211 and accompanying text infra. Yet Hart does not develop
this concept of centralization. Second, "official" seems at some times to be explicitly
defined as a cultural concept, the meaning of which varies from society to society.
This conception views an "official" as anyone designated as such by the rule of
recognition of a particular society. Since the content of the rule changes from society
to society, the specific definition of "official" also varies. See id. at 111-14; cf.
discussion of internal point of view, id. at 54-60, 85-88, 96, 134-37, 244. Adopting such
a cultural view of "official" would result in a serious flaw in Hart's model because
concepts which are defined uniquely in each society cannot be used in cross-societal
comparisons. See note 175 and accompanying text infra.
54. Although Hart never defines society, he apparently assumes that it has
certain regularities, i.e., that it is ordered and its component parts (e.g., individuals)
coordinate their action to some extent. See HART, CONCEPT 89-96. Moreover, he
refers to a lack of social control as "fatal to social life." Id. at 192.
55. E.g., HART, CONCEPT, ch. 5. This chapter, which is entitled "Law as the Union
of Primary and Secondary Rules" (emphasis added), notes that earlier theories failed
because they did not include "the idea of a rule, without which we cannot hope to
elucidate even the most elementary forms of law." Id. at 78.
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55

some succeeding sections. At present the focus will be on Hart's
discussion of the central role that rules play in all legal systems.
a. The nature of rules
Before developing a general definition of rules, it should be noted
that Hart distinguishes between two basic types of rules - primary
and secondary. The basis of this distinction is the assertion that a
rule of the form:
"Thou shalt not do X (e.g., murder) ; if you do X then Y sanction (e.g., hanging) will be imposed."
is "fundamentally" different from a rule of the form:
"If you want to do A (e.g., make a will), then you must do B
(e.g., have three witnesses)."
In the first case failure to comply usually results in intervention and
affirmative action by the legal system. In the second case non-compliance results in nullity, nothing more. Given this distinction, Hart
develops a two-fold typology of rules :56
(R-1)

Rules can be divided into two basic types:
(a) Primary rules which dictate certain behavior patterns and which usually, but not necessarily, provide
that sanctions will be imposed for breach of the rule.
(b) Secondary rules which
(1) confer "power":
(A) to create primary rules or subordinate
secondary rules;
(B) to interpret primary rules;

56. HART, CONCEPT, ch. 5. The basic thrust of Hart's distinction is reflected
in the following quotation:
It is true that the idea of a rule is by no means a simple one: we have already
seen in Chapter III the need, if we are to do justice to the complexity of a
legal system, to discriminate between two different though related types. Under
rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or primary type,
human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they
wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic upon or secondary
to the first; for they provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain
things introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones,
or in various ways determine their incidence or control their operations. Rules
of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type confer powers, public
or private. Rules of the first type concern actions involving physical movement
or changes; rules of the second type provide for operations which lead not
merely to physical movement or change, but to the creation or variation of
duties or obligations.
Id. at 78-79.
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(C) to apply primary rules to facts; and
(D) to apply sanctions for breach of primary
rules; and,
(2) nullify the attempted exercise of power if the
rule is not followed.
It should be noted that in Hart's model a primary rule that
prohibits murder is still a rule even though no penalty is provided;
by definition,5 7 however, no such separation of nullity and a secondary
rule is possible.5
With these two basic types of rule in mind, it is possible to
discuss Hart's general definition of a rule. Hart does not define a
rule at any one place in The Concept of Law. However, when the
book is read as a whole, it is apparent that a "rule" is viewed by
Hart in terms of four elements: (1) a symbolic communication of
a specified standard of conduct to someone who must conform to the
standard;5 9 (2) an "internal attitude" toward the rule by those to
whom it is directed, which is manifested as an awareness that the
rule provides a "binding" standard, i.e., behavior "ought" to conform
and the rule "justifies" the sanction for non-conformity;60 (3) a pat57. This article adopts Hart's usage of the term "definition" as a "rule by

reference to which the correctness of the use of the word can be tested .
CONcEPT 17.

" HART,

58. Hart makes the distinction as follows:
In the case of rules of the criminal law, it is logically possible and might
be desirable that there should be such rules even though no punishment or other
evil were threatened. It may of course be argued that in that case they would
not be legal rules; nonetheless, we can distinguish clearly the rule prohibiting
certain behaviour from the provision for penalties to be exacted if the rule is
broken, and suppose the first to exist without the latter. We can, in a sense,
subtract the sanction and still leave an intelligible standard of behaviour which
it was designed to maintain. But we cannot logically make such a distinction
between the rule requiring compliance with certain conditions, e.g. attestation
for a valid will, and the so-called sanction of 'nullity'. In this case, if failure
to comply with this essential condition did not entail nullity, the rule itself
could not be intelligibly said to exist without sanctions even as a non-legal rule.
The provision for nullity is part of this type of rule itself in a way which
punishment attached to a rule imposing duties is not. If failure to get the
ball between the posts did not mean the 'nullity' of not scoring, the scoring
rules could not be said to exist.
HART, CONCEPT 34-35 (emphasis in original).
For a discussion of this aspect of
Hart's model, see Tappen, Powers and Secondary Rules of Change, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (A. Simpson ed. 2d ser. 1973).
59. HART, CONCEPT

121-22.

60. Id. at 55-57, 86-88, 96, 134-37. This internal attitude is related to, but not
the same as, "obligation." Id. at 79-88. Since Hart regards an understanding of
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tern of behavior in conformity to the rule;61 and (4) the effect of non62
compliance with the rule.

These four elements are all necessary in "studying" or understanding rules, but the first two aspects are very different from the
last two. In Hart's scheme a rule is defined6" in terms of the first
two elements -

there is no rule unless there is both a communication

and an internal sense of the binding nature of the communication. The
third aspect of rules is not crucial to the existence of a rule because a
"obligation" as "crucial," id. at 82, some further development of this concept is in

order :
A orders B to hand over his money and threatens to shoot him if he does not
comply. According to the theory of coercive orders this situation illustrates
the notion of obligation or duty in general. . . . The plausibility of the claim
that the gunman situation displays the meaning of obligation lies in the fact
that it is certainly one in which we would say that B, if he obeyed, was 'obliged'
to hand over his money. It is, however, equally certain that we should misdescribe the situation if we said, on these facts, that B 'had an obligation' or a
'duty' to hand over the money.
There is a difference . . . between the assertion that someone was

obliged to do something and the assertion that he had an obligation to do it.
The first is often a statement about the beliefs and motives with which an
action is done: B was obliged to hand over his money may simply mean, as it
does in the gunman case, that he believed that some harm or other unpleasant
consequences would befall him if he did not hand it over and he handed it over
to avoid those consequences. In such cases the prospect of what would happen to
the agent if he disobeyed has rendered something he would otherwise have
preferred to have done (keep the money) less eligible.
...But the statement that someone had an obligation to do something is of
a very different type and there are many signs of this difference. Thus not
only is it the case that the facts about B's action and his beliefs and motives
in the gunman case, though sufficient to warrant the statement that B was
obliged to hand over his purse, are not sufficient to warrant the statement that he
had an obligation to do this; it is also the case that facts of this sort, i.e. facts about
beliefs and motives, are not necessary for the truth of a statement that a person
had an obligation to do something. Thus the statement that a person had an
obligation, e.g. to tell the truth or report for military service, remains true
even if he believed (reasonably or unreasonably) that he would never be found
out and had nothing to fear from disobedience. Moreover, whereas the statement
that he had this obligation is quite independent of the question whether or not
he in fact reported for service, the statement that someone was obliged to do
something, normally carries the implication that he actually did it.
Id. at 80-81. The thrust of these passages might be summarized by viewing obligation
as the internal attitude accompanying primary rules. Id. at 84-85.
61. Id. at 54. With both social rules and habits "the behavior in question .
must be general though not necessarily invariable; this means that it is repeated when
occasion arises by most of the group... ." Id.
62. Id. at 34-35, 78-88, 95. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
63. For discussion of the role of definition, see note 57 supra.
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rule is still a rule even if behavior does not conform: "broken" rules
64
are still rules.
The final element in considering rules requires further discussion
because the responses to or effects of non-compliance must be viewed
not only in terms of the behavior which actually occurs when the
rule is not followed, but also in terms of the "formal" theoretical
requirements as to what the communication must declare concerning
the effects of a breach. As indicated in the preceding discussion of
the two types of rules,6 5 the "formal" theoretical requirements are
as follows: (1) A primary rule is defined as still being a rule even
if there is no provision for penalty in case of breach; and (2) A
secondary rule is defined as a rule which provides that the effect of
breach is nullity. The behavioral response to breach is measured by
a less stringent standard: both types of rules are still rules even if
breach does not in fact result in a penalty (primary rule) or nullity
(secondary rule). In other words, an unenforced rule is still a rule
so long as the two formal definitional requirements of the concept
of a rule are satisfied.
Hart's use of these four elements in his model can be summarized in the following perspective on a rule:
(R-2) A rule:
(a) Requires:
(1) A "communication" of a prescribed standard
of conduct (See Proposition R-3(a) below),
and
(2) An internal attitude manifested as an awareness of the "binding" nature of the standard.
(b)

Is usually (but not always) accompanied by a pattern of behavior in conformity with the rule. (However, see Proposition R-5 below).

(c)

Deals with breach of the rule as follows:
(1) The formal declaration
(A) of a primary rule will usually (but not
always) provide a penalty for breach;
(B) of a secondary rule will always provide
that a breach results in nullity.
(2) The actual enforcement for breach of rules will
usually (but not always) conform with the
declaration.

64. HART, CONCEPT 138-40.
65. See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
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There is always a symbolic, informational aspect involved in
dictating behavior (Proposition R-2 (a) (1)), and certain charact'eristics of a rule are imposed by this aspect. For example, no information has been conveyed if the rule is unintelligible to the persons
subject to the rule; thus, rules must be communicated in an intelligible
fashion if they are to control.66 Similarly, the rules must be com6
municated prior to the actions involved if they are to be effective. T
However, given man's limited ability to foresee future developments
(Proposition M-3 (c)), there may be situations where the symbolic
68
communication occurs after the act.
As a result of man's limited ability to process information, other
generalizations can be made about rules. First, rules cannot deal with
every specific act. Instead, rules on the whole will have to be directed
toward general classes of persons and/or classes of behavior.6 9 Moreover, even relatively specific commands are plagued by the inherent
ambiguity of language. 70 The net result of man's limited ability
to foresee and consider all possible events and to communicate concerning those events is that rules cannot conclusively deal with all
possible behavioral possibilities. There will always be a class of
behavior which may or may not fall within the scope of the rule.
This area of uncertain inclusion is referred to by Hart as the "open71
textured" quality of rules.

Thus, based on the communication aspects of a rule the following
proposition is included in Hart's model:
(R-3) The symbolic component of a rule will
(a) Usually be communicated
(1) to those affected
(2) prior to the conduct involved, and
(3) in a form
(A) that is intelligible to those affected; and
(B) that refers to general classes of persons and
conduct.
66. HART,
67. Id.

CONCEPT 202.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 121.
70. Id. at 123-24.
71. HART, CONcEPT, ch. 7. For example, Hart notes:

Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication
of standards of behavior, these, however smoothly they work over the great
mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their application is in question,
prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open texture.

Id. at 124.
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(b) Always be "open textured" - i.e., of the set of
"possible behavior" there will be three subjects:
(1) a "closed" subset of behavior which is clearly
included;
(2) a "closed" subset of behavior which is clearly
excluded;
(3) an "open" subset of behavior which is not
clearly included or excluded. (This conflicts
with Proposition R-3 (a) (2), (3) (A), but
is necessitated by Propositions M-3(c) and
R-3(a) (3) (B)).
b. Pattern or formal structure of rules and legal systems in
society
Society requires a certain minimum of order (Proposition S-4).
However, given man's limitations (Proposition M-3, particularly
M-3(b)), this co-ordination will not occur automatically. Therefore,
constraints on behavior must be imposed.72 Obviously, these constraints cannot be imposed effectively unless they are communicated
to the members of society. (Proposition R-3 (a)). Because of man's
limited ability to process information (Proposition M-3 (c)), these
communications must be generalized. (Proposition R-3(a) (3) (B)).
Moreover, given man's limited ability to impose his will on other men
(Proposition M-3), those subject to the constraints must conform
to them at least in part out of something more than "fear" of sanctions. This "something more" could be a number of things, but
Hart asserts that it always includes an internal sense of obligation to
some extent. 7" (Compare Proposition R-11 below). Therefore,
Hart's model contains the following proposition:
(R-4) Societies must have rules.74
Since a society must have a minimum of order (Proposition
S-4), there must be not only rules but also some consistency in rules.
Otherwise, different rule-prescribed patterns of behavior could con72. Id. at 192-93.
73. This is implicit in his statement that in "any large group general rules,
standards, and principles must be the main instrument of social control," id. at 121,
because rules by definition include the internal aspect. See Proposition R-2(a) (2)
and discussion accompanying notes 59-63 supra. Hart develops this point in another
context by noting that there are societies characterized by a "simpler decentralized
pre-legal form of social structure which consists only of primary rules. . . . [These]
rules must be widely accepted as setting critical standards for the behaviour of the
group. If, there, the internal view is not widely disseminated there could not logically
be any rules." Id. at 113-14 (emphasis added).
74. HART, CONCEPT 121.
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flict and the minimal order could not be achieved. Thus, societies must
have "systems" of rules which form a coherent whole."5 This coherence
is achieved by a "rule of recognition," which determines whether the
other subordinate rules comply with the system - i.e., whether they
7
are "valid."
The content of the rule of recognition. its definition of
validity - is developed over time.7 7 This development has two
dimensions:
[O]ne is expressed in the external statement of fact that the
rule exists in the actual practice of the system; the other is
expressed in the internal statements
of validity made by those
1
who use it in identifying the law.
The first element is required because without a minimum level of
7
obedience to the rule of recognition (which provides consistency) ,

75. See id. at 90, 92-93, 112-13, 228-31.
76. Id. at 92, 97-114. The textual discussion preceding this note could be
expressed more formally as follows:
(1) A society is in a state of disintegration (D) if its level of order (0)

falls below a certain level (X).

(Proposition S-4).

(0 < X) + D
(2) In a society without rules (R), the level of order will fall below level X.
(Proposition R-4).

'R - (0 < X) + D
(3) Even with rules, a society will fall below level X if the consistency or
internal order (C) of the rules falls below a certain level (Y).

(C < Y) + (0 < X) + D
(4) With a rule of recognition (R o R), the level of consistency (C) will
rise above (Y).

(R O R)

+

(C > Y) - (0 > X)

+

(%D)

77. See note 84 and accompanying text infra.
78. HART, CONCEPT 108.

79. The "obedience" does not need to correlate with an internal perspective
toward the rule:
[0]beying a rule (or an order) need involve no thought on the part of the
person obeying that what he does is the right thing both for himself and for others
to do: he need have no view of what he does as a fulfilment of a standard of
behaviour for others of the social group. He need not think of his conforming
behaviour as 'right', 'correct', or 'obligatory'. His attitude, in other words, need
not have any of that critical character which is involved whenever social rules
are accepted and types of conduct are treated as general standards. He need not,
though he may, share the internal point of view accepting the rules as standards
for all to whom they apply. Instead, he may think of the rule only as something
demanding action from him under the threat of penalty; he may obey it out of
fear of the consequences, or from inertia, without thinking of himself or others
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the minimum-order requirement of Proposition S-4 is not satisfied.
The second aspect is essential because the rule of recognition must
satisfy the two requirements of the definition of a rule set out in
Proposition R-2. The communication aspects of a rule (Proposition
R-2 (a) (1)) are satisfied by the overt reference to the rule by those
who use it. Similarly, the internal aspects of a rule (Proposition
R-2 (a)(2)) are satisfied by these same people recognizing the
binding nature of the rule of recognition.
It should be noted that there are two characteristics of the rule
of recognition, each of which makes it a unique type of rule. First,
the internal acceptance need only be satisfied by the "officials" of the
legal system.80 Second, the minimum-obedience aspect of the rule
of recognition makes it the only rule which requires that behavior
conform to some degree of its prescriptions. A totally disregarded
rule of recognition is logically impossible in Hart's system, while a
as having an obligation to do so and without being disposed to criticize either
himself or others for deviations.
HART, CONCEPT 112 (emphasis in original). See note 104 infra.
80. Hart summarizes this distinction:
There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a legal system. On the one hand those rules of behaviour which are
valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally
obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria
of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively
accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials. The
first condition is the only one which private citizens need satisfy: they may obey
each 'for his part only', and from any motive whatever; though in a healthy society
they will in fact oftenh accept these rules as common standards of behaviour
and acknowledge an obligation to obey them, or even trace this obligation to a
more general obligation to respect the constitution. The second condition must
also be satisfied by the officials of the system. They must regard these as
common standards of bfficial behaviour and appraise critically their own and
each other's deviations as lapses.
Id. at 113 (emphasis in original). Hart also notes that:
Here surely the reality of the situation is that a great proportion of ordinary
citizens - perhaps a majority - have no general conception of the legal structure
or of its criteria of validity. The law which he obeys is something which he
knows of only as 'the law'. He may obey it for a variety of different reasons
and among them may often, though not always, be the knowledge that it will be
best for him to do so. He will be aware of the general likely consequences of
disobedience: that there are officials who may arrest him and others who will
try him and send him to prison for breaking the law. So long as the laws
which are valid by the system's tests of validity are obeyed by the bulk of the
population this surely is all the evidence we need in order to establish that a
given legal system exists.
Id. at 111. For a further discussion of the distinction between obedience and internal
acceptance, see sources cited in note 49 supra, and quotation in note 79 supra.
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totally disregarded lesser rule can logically still be termed a rule.
(Proposition R-2 (b)).
Given these two aspects - external observance and internal
acceptance - the process of determining the existence and content
of the "rule of recognition" in a society involves the following steps:
(1) observe the society over time to determine whether its various
rules are consistent;"1 (2) if they are consistent, determine whether
this consistency correlates with a supreme "rule" of validity which is
"accepted" by the "officials" in -the society ;82 (3) if this acceptance
exists, determine whether the behavior of citizens generally conforms
to the supreme rule of validity, i.e., whether they generally obey
the "rules" promulgated by the "officials." 8 3 (See APPENDIX 2 for
a more formal development of this observational process.) In other
words, the "rule of recognition" identifies a pattern persisting in the
society over some period of time. Consequently, a particular statement of that society's rule of recognition at' a given time cannot
provide a prediction concerning the content of the rule in the future.
Moreover, one cannot say that the content of the rule of recognition
has changed until after a change has persisted for a period of time. 4
This concept of a rule of recognition is summarized in the following proposition:
(R-5) Legal rules are unified into a system by a "rule of recognition" which is a type of secondary rule authorizing
certain persons ("officials") to exercise various powers
in a consistent, systematic manner. (Proposition R-1 (b)).
(a) The rule of recognition has two dimensions:
(1) A minimal level of obedience by citizens to the
rules promulgated by the "officials" identified by
the rule; and
(2) A shared acceptance by the "officials" of the rule
of recognition. Such "acceptance" is manifested
by
81. Id. at 111, 113-20.
82. Id.

83. Id.
84. The dynamic aspect of the rule of recognition is developed throughout Chapter
6 of THE CONCEPT OF LAW. An example of the time span involved in dealing with
the rule of recognition as the unifying element of a legal system is illustrated by
Hart's comment that "the statement that a legal system exists is of a sufficiently
broad and general type to allow for interruptions; it is not verified or falsified by
what happens in short spaces of time." Id. at 115.
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(A) a minimal level of obedience to the rule of
recognition in exercising their power under
the rule,
(B) an internal awareness of the binding nature of the rule, and
(C) external references to the rule.
(b) The rule of recognition is developed over time as the
above pattern of obedience and acceptance manifests
itself. Therefore,
(1) it can only be identified retrospectively, and
(2) changes over a short period of time do not
affect it.
A society which has only primary rules is relatively static because
it can change rules only gradually. 85 (Proposition R-1 (b) (1)
(A)). Similarly, without secondary rules to create "official powers,"
a society cannot use specialists in interpreting and applying rules and
in imposing sanctions. 6 (Proposition R-1(b)(1)(B), (C), (D)).
Therefore, primitive societies with few or no secondary rules are
less "efficient" than dynamic societies with a large proportion of
complex secondary rules.8 7 (Propositions S-2, S-3). Hart divides
these secondary rules into four types, 88 but for present purposes it
is sufficient to express the relationship between the society and
secondary rules as follows:
Id. at 90-91, 93-94. The basis of this statement is developed more fully in
accompanying notes 212-16 infra.
Id. at 91-96.
Id. at 89-96. See note 51 supra.
The four types are:
(1) "Rule of recognition." HART, CONCEPT 92-93.
(2) "Rules of change." Id. at 93-94.
(3) "Rules of adjudication." Id. at 94-95.
(4) Secondary rules which "provide the centralized official 'sanctions' of the
system." Id. at 95.
This typology has not been followed because it is inconsistent with the definition of
rule of recognition developed in detail by Hart in Chapter 6. If both approaches were
followed, there would be two types of Rule of Recognition:
(1) The authoritative text (e.g., a stone tablet) with no officials. Id. at 92.
(2) Rules identified by reference to "officials" (who promulgate rules, apply
rules, etc.) Id. at 93, 95, ch. 6. See Proposition R-5.
Since this inconsistency of terminology makes Hart's model very hard to formalize,
the fourfold typology has not been followed. If the typology were to be kept, the
first sense of rule of recognition should be given a name like "Rule of Identification."
This Rule of Identification solves uncertainty and thus is like a Rule of Recognition
in the second sense, but is only a primitive approach to a Rule of Recognition since
it lacks "officials." The use of two senses for Rule of Recognition is a minor
inconsistency because the existence of a society with a Rule of Identification but
no officials is very unlikely.

85.
the text
86.
87.
88.
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(R-6) Secondary rules make it possible for society to be dynamic and to have legal "officials." (Proposition R-1).
Therefore, societies with such rules are more "efficient"
than societies without them. (Propositions S-2, S-3).
The following diagram summarizes the development of Hart's
model to this point:

(behavior; Proposition R-5 (b))

SR - Secondary Rule
PR - Primary Rule

89. The rule of recognition need not be a written constitution, but if one exists
then it is an obvious candidate for the rule of recognition in that society. HART,
CONCEPT 103. See note 202 infra.
90. The diagram refers to the fact that institutions such as courts, legislatures,
and executives are created by a secondary rule. For example, Hart states that "the
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It should be noted that Hart is not merely asserting that some societies
have this structure. The assertion is that all non-primitive societies
have this pattern and that his model enables us to identify the pattern and "classify" its component parts.
c. The content of law
Hart's model is not limited to the formal structure of rules in
society. He also comments on the necessary substantive content of
legal rules. The first such assertion is:
(R-7) The legal rules must limit -the use of deadly force. 96 (See
Propositions M-1(b) and M-3(a)).
Given the central role of survival in Hart's model of man, the necessity of this requirement is obvious. The other substantive requirements
demand more discussion.
. Men have limited resources available to them. (Proposition
M-3 (e)). In order to provide minimal order (Proposition S-4),
these resources must be divided in some reasonably stable, identifiable
manner. Thus, a legal system must have some rules substantively
concerned with material property:
(R-8) The legal rules must contain some substantive "property"
governing material resources whereby:
*rules
(a) at any particular time
others
(b) a particular person(s) may exclude all
7
(c) from a particular material resource.1
existence of a court entails the existence of secondary rules conferring jurisdiction
on a changing succession of individuals and so making their decisions authoritative."

Id. at 133.
91. The concepts of "court," "legislature," and "executive" are meant to serve

as examples only. The rule of recognition does not necessarily create such institutions.
92. Although the testator is certainly exercising power granted by a secondary
rule, it is not clear whether he is an "official" in Hart's scheme. Therefore, it is
also uncertain whether his internal perspective on the rule is relevant in determining
the rule of recognition. For a more general discussion of the ambiguity of "officials,"
see discussion and references in note 53 supra. Hart provides no assistance here by
stating that:
[M]any of the features which puzzle us in the institutions of contract or property
are clarified by thinking of the operations of making a contract or transferring
property as the exercise of limited legislative powers by individuals.
HART, CONCEPT 94.
93. The executor may be granted powers by the testator.
94. Criminal law is used as an example only. There are other types of primary

rules. See

HART, CONCEPT

27.

95. As indicated in notes 274 and 275 to APPENDIX 2 infra, determining which
citizens are "affected" presents conceptual problems.

96.

HART, CONCEPT

190; see id. at 85, 89, 167.

97. HART, CONCEPT 192. Hart also phrases this point by noting that "rules must
contain in some form restrictions on . . . theft . . . .", id. at 89, and that "[a]mong
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Hart has assumed that dynamic societies with a division of
labor are more efficient (Propositions S-2, S-3). Thus the system of
rules should include a way to achieve a society which is characterized
by both change and a division of labor.98 Individuals, therefore, must
be given some authority to engage in exchange and to determine the
conditions of exchange. The following proposition results :99
(R-9) The legal rules must contain some secondary rules which
authorize individuals:
(a) to exchange property and services, and
(b) to "contract" for future exchanges of property and/or
services.
Hart notes that the property rules (Proposition R-8) need not involve individual ownership,1"' which is a broader concept than the
power of exchange developed in Proposition R-9.
These exchange relationships will not be successful unless the
communications between individuals are reliable. Therefore, individuals must be forbidden from dishonest, misleading communications, i.e., fraud and such dishonesty in exchange must be prohibited by the rules. 101 More generally, a society where the members
could not trust one another in vital matters would face difficulties
in satisfying the minimal function of survival. Consequently, because
societies must have rules which substantively limit dishonesty, the
following proposition emerges:
(R-10) The legal rules must limit the use of dishonest or deliberately misleading communications.
Given limited resources (Proposition M-3(e)) and limited
altruism (Proposition M-3(b)), the preceding rules will not work
unless there is some element of coercion.102 Moreover, these sanctions
would not work unless men were all relatively equal (Proposition M-3),
such rules obviously required for social life are . . . rules forbidding the destruction
of tangible things or their seizure from others." Id. at 167.

98. Id. at 192.
99. Id. at 192-93. Just as theft is implicit in the concept of property, see note
97 supra, so also is the concept of limiting deception and fraud (Proposition R-10)
necessarily involved in developing these exchange rules. See HART, CONCEPT 85, 89.
100. HART, CONCEPT 192.

101. Id. at 85, 167.

See, e.g., G. TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 228-40

(1971).
102. HART, CONCEPT 193.
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because if it were otherwise, "superstrong" rule violators could escape
sanctions. 10 3 Thus, all legal systems will have some substantive
coercive elements:
(R-11)

The legal system must impose sanctions
breaches in order to coerce behavior.

for

some

This proposition does not contradict the earlier statement that a rule
does not necessarily require coercion. (Proposition R-1 (b) (2)).
A rule is more likely to be effective if coercion is involved; consequently, Proposition R-11 asserts that societies must use sufficient
coercion in support of (some) rules so that the requisite minimum
order will be assured. (Proposition S-4; Proposition R-4).
One aspect of the model of man is that no single person can
impose his behavioral requirements on others for any period of time
(Proposition M-3); therefore, an individual "ruler" needs the cooperation of a significant part of the society.
[I]t is plain that neither the law nor the accepted morality
of societies need extend their minimal protections and benefits
to all within their scope ....
[But] if a system of rules is to be imposed by force
on any, there must be a sufficient number who accept it voluntarily. Without their voluntary co-operation . . . the coercive
power of law and government cannot be established. °4
Thus, Hart asserts that rules must be minimally beneficial to a substantial portion of a society by granting this portion mutual benefits
in the content of law.' 0 5 The following proposition summarizes this
mutuality in the content of law:
(R-12) The rules must have some minimal mutuality of content
for a significant part of society so that this segment of
society will be given an incentive for co-operation with
the rules.
The final requirement concerning the content of a system of
rules is that the behavior must be possible. 1 6 (See Proposition M-3
103. Id. at 191, 194.
104. Id. at 196 (emphasis in original). Similar language is found at 88-89, 191,
195-97.
105. To accomplish this minimal mutuality, not all laws must be accepted by a
substantial portion of society. Instead it is sufficient if a substantial portion of
society supports the system of rules. See id. at 197; cf. Proposition R-5. Even with
this qualification Proposition R-12 is ambiguous. See text accompanying notes 145
& 228-30 infra.
106. HART, CONCEPT 202; see id. at 167.
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(f)). Rules which require the impossible will clearly fail as a method
of social control. Thus the following proposition is part of the model:
(R-13) Rules, particularly primary rules, must contain provisions
that can in fact be obeyed.
d. Exclusions from the model.
Models are designed to identify and focus on certain features in
the real world so that men can discuss the world without being overwhelmed by detail and trivia. 10 7 (Proposition M-3(c)). Such a
focusing process necessarily involves some exclusion of elements which
in the "real world" may be related to the elements in the model.
Thus, modeling has several aspects: first, the identification of particular elements for focus with the necessary exclusion of other elements;
second, an analysis of the relationships among the elements included in the model; and third, an evaluation of the model.10" The
identification of elements and relationships in Hart's model has
already been discussed. The evaluation of his model will be discussed
in the next section. The present section discusses some of the significant elements which Hart does not include in his model even though
he admits that they have "real-world" relationships with the elements
of his model.
There are two significant elements which Hart concedes are relevant but which he excludes nonetheless'0 9 - (1) morality, and (2)
justice, which Hart views as a subset of morality." 0 Since these
107. For a discussion of model building, see K. DEUTSCH, THE NERVES O1'
GOVERNMENT 3-21 (1966) ; J. FORRESTER, INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS (1961) ; THE PROCESS
OF MODEL-BUILDING IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (R. Stogdill ed. 1970). The
focusing is usually accomplished by a process of limiting the variables to be
considered. One common method of limiting the variables that is relevant to Hart's
models is to group or "aggregate" numerous individual characteristics with "similar"
characteristics into one variable. See, e.g., J. FORRESTER, supra, 109-11 (1961);
A. STYNCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 28-30 (1968). In extreme cases
of aggregation the resulting variables are referred to as "typologies." See, e.g.,
J. McKINNEY, CONSTRUCTIVE TYPOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY (1966). Classification
by the use of typologies is particularly helpful where a continuum is involved.
For example, continuous gradations in income can be grouped into a small number
of conceptually discontinuous income levels or classes for the purpose of theoretical
discussion.
108. See note 107 supra.
109. Hart also excludes a third element - "international law" - from his model
because there is no rule of recognition which unifies the various rules into a
consistent system. Thus, although there are similarities between international law
and municipal law, these two phenomena are sufficiently distinct to warrant excluding
international law from Hart's model of law as a system of rules. HART, CONCEPT
208-31.
110. HART, CONCEPT chs. 8 (Justice and Morality) & 9 (Laws and Morals).
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concepts are not involved in his model, Hart does not develop them
in any depth. Instead, he goes only far enough to show that they
are different from the system of rules, which forms the core of his
model of law. Because of these differences, morality and justice are
excluded from the general conceptual model even though particular
concepts of morality and justice are extremely important in the content of a particular legal system.
Hart asserts that justice is a more narrow and specific concern
than morality."' Basically, justice is concerned with fairness, which
is usually interpreted to mean "treat like cases alike, unlike cases
unlike.""n 2 This same requirement is built into Hart's view of law
as a system of rules, i.e., rules are concerned with classes of behavior
(groups of "like" behavior) (Proposition R-2) and must have some
mutuality of content (Proposition R-12). Hart recognizes that his
statements constitute only a partial perspective on justice because a
"complete" model of justice would include a criterion of likeness."'
But, because of the lack of a universal pattern of agreement on such
a criterion," 4 expanding his general model of law by incorporating
a particular test of likeness would destroy its generality." 5 Therefore, since Hart is seeking a model of law that vill be applicable
to the classification and explanation of legal systems in various cultures at various times and places, he excludes justice from his model
of law even though he admits that each culture's perspectives on
justice are extremely relevant to its own legal system."'
Morality is identified by Hart as a form of social control which
is based on rules and which is unique in that it has all four of the
following cardinal features :..
(1) Importance (vis a vis the unimportance of some legal
rules - e.g., parking meter ordinances - and of social rules of
manners or dress).
(2) Immunity from deliberate change (There are no secondary rules; only primary).
111. Id. at 153-54.
112. Id. at 155.
113. Id. at 155-56.
114. Id. at 157-59.
115. See id. at 204-05. Hart notes that including morality as an element in the
model
must inevitably split, in a confusing way, our effort to understand both the
development and potentialities of the specific method of social control to be
seen in a system of primary and secondary rules. Study of its use involves
study of its abuse.
Id. at 205.
116. See id. at 163-65, 176-80, 199-207.
117. Id. at 165-76.
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(3) Voluntary character (A "good try" is all that is required).
(4) The form of social pressure (Enforcement of moral
rules is characterized by (a) appeals to "binding" nature of rule
and (b) diffused application of sanctions because there are no
secondary rules authorizing centralized application of sanctions).
Thus, morality is a unique method of social control by rules which
can be distinguished from law. Moreover, there is no necessary general
relationship between the content of law and the content of morality.
Different societies can reach extremely different positions on the
content of morality and its relationship to the content of law."' Thus,
there are no general patterns of the form: law must (must not) enforce
or comply with X moral rules. Consequently, morality is excluded
from Hart's general model of law." 9
The basis of Hart's exclusion of justice and morality from his
model can be illustrated by the following metaphor. Suppose one
wanted to analyze mechanical thermostats used in regulating the
temperature in large buildings. One could learn a lot about the general
form of operation of all such thermostats. Moreover, given certain
knowledge concerning human beings, broad statements could be made
about the range of temperature settings - for example, 320 and
150' F would probably be excluded. Suppose, however, one wanted
to know the particular setting of the thermostat in a specific building.
At this point general design features of thermostats would not be
very helpful - one would have to examine the unique aspects of
that building and its occupants.' ° To complete the analogy, law is
like a thermostat; it regulates behavior rather than temperature. And
it is extremely useful to learn the general principles underlying both
regulators. However, this study becomes confused if one starts asking why the X building has a setting of 680 F rather than 650 F or
why a particular society has a "fault" system of tort rather than
social insurance. These are important questions to the citizens of
those cultures; but they do not advance the discussion of the general
design of regulators. Thus, Hart has excluded specific concepts of
justice and morality from his model of law so that he can focus on
the general underlying features of using law as a social regulator.
Having asserted that law is distinct from morality, Hart then
addresses the problem of classifying any general patterns of interaction between the two distinct models: the model of law and the
118.
119.
120.
tinction

Id. at 163-65, 176-80.
Id. at 163-65, 176-80, 205-07.
See, e.g., W. ASHBY, INTRODUCTION
between regulation and control).

TO CYBERNETICS §

11/14 (1963)

(dis-
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model of morality and justice. The following propositions summarize

this interaction :121
(R-14) Morality affects the content of a particular legal system
by influencing:
(a) The content of rules - both secondary and primary;
and
(b) The interpretation of rules in the "open textured"
area.
(R-15) Relationships between law and morality more specific
than these identified in Proposition R-14 are culturally
determined. Thus,
(a) there is no necessary direct relationship between the
validity of a law (based -on the content of the society's "rule of recognition") and the morality or
justice of that law, and
(b) there is no necessary direct relationship between
morality and content of laws. (Compare Propositions R-7 through R-12).
C. Critical Analysis of the Model
1. The "Validity" of a Model
Because validity is a relative matter, one cannot evaluate Hart's
model without considering: (1) the functions involved (e.g., it is a
"valid" classification scheme by some measure of validity of such
schemes) ;122 (2) the possible degrees of adequately fulfilling a particular function ;113 and, (3) the relative rankings of the various
theoretical functions. 2 4 Consequently, the following text will discuss
validity in terms of the functions involved. In particular, the emphasis
will be on: (1) the extent -to which Hart's model provides an "objective" classification system which can be used as an analytical tool by
diverse jurisprudents;125 and (2) the need for developing models
which satisfy the functions of prediction and technological control
more "adequately" than does Hart's model. The latter focus has been
included to demonstrate the need to go beyond classification models
1 26
and develop prediction and control models.

121.

HART, CONCEPT

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See
See
See
See
See

176-80, 195-207.

text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
text following note 16 supra.
text preceding note 17 supra.
text accompanying notes 21-24 supra.
text accompanying notes 8-9 supra, and text preceding note 17 supra.
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2. Implicit Models of Man and Society
a. Model of Man
Hart's model of man was developed earlier in terms of four
propositions. The first proposition is:
(M-1) Man is purposive or goal-oriented.
(a) Specific goals vary from individual to individual and
from time to time, but all men are goal-oriented.
(b) Virtually all men have the goal of survival which is
an equilibrium state called "life."
(c) There are no other goals common to nearly all men.
Behavioral scientists disagree concerning Proposition M-1. Some
support Hart's view of man as purposive,127 while other theorists
reject this model. 128 The basic criticism of models like Hart's is that
particular events or occurrences which are deemed desirable in the
future are inherently unobservable since they have not taken place and
therefore internal desires are also beyond observation. Therefore, such
phenomena are beyond the boundary of a strictly empirical model of
man.' 29 Those behavioral scientists who support models like Hart's
argue that the concepts of goal, purposiveness, and rationality can be
phrased in terms of objectively observable phenomena.' 30 Although
examination of this debate is beyond the scope of this article, 13' it

should be noted that these aspects of Hart's model are not the obvious
truisms that he asserts and that, therefore, his model falls short of
providing an "objective" classification scheme.
Proposition M-I(c) presents further difficulties because it is
inconsistent with some behavioral data which suggest that other goals
127. See authorities cited in note 130 infra.
128. See authorities cited in note 129 infra.
129. E.g., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW 5-6 (D. Black & M. Mileski eds.
1973) ; Taylor, Comments on a Mechanistic Conception of Purposiveness and Purposeful and non-Purposeful Behavior: A Rejoinder, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 226-31, 238-42 (W. Buckley ed. 1968); Black, The
Boundaries of Legal Sociology, 81 YALE L.J. 1086 (1972).
130. See, e.g., Rosenblueth, Weiner & Bigelow, Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology;

Rosenblueth & Weiner, Purposeful and Non-Purposeful Behavior; and Churchman &
Ackoff, Purposive Behavior and Cybernetics, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH FOR
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 221-25, 232-37, 243-49 (W. Buckley ed. 1968).
131. For an introduction to the debate, see sources cited in notes 129-30 supra.
For a presentation of the issues within the context of the sociology of law, see THE
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW 5-6, 16-56 (D. Black & M. Mileski eds. 1973);

Hubbard, "Sociology of Law:" One View from the Lawyers' Side of the Fence,
7 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 458 (1976).
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are common to all men. Proposition M-1(b) states that the set of
situations characterized by "life" is preferable to situations characterized by "death," i.e., it is better to be alive than dead. Proposition
M-1(c) makes the additional assertion that, although individual
humans prefer some life situations over others, for man in general
all the possible situations in life are the same. Initially this seems
incomplete because all men also seek to avoid physical pain even where
such pain does not involve a threat to life. Sexual gratification also
would seem to be a goal common to nearly all adult humans. Moreover, if Proposition M-1 (c) were valid, then people/societies with
such "quality of life" concerns as the "standard" of living, "justice,"
privacy, and the intimate relationships of love and friendship should
be no more common than people/societies without such concerns.
However, such a random distribution of concerns does not seem to
exist.1 3 2 Instead, there does seem to be a sense in which virtually

all people/societies share a concern for the "quality of life." This
concern is often evidenced by a willingness to encounter a "risk"
(as opposed to a "certainty") of death to accomplish this "qualityof-life" goal. Furthermore, "quality of life" seems to be delineated by
a common set of goals, although the relative importance of the various
goals may vary. Consider, for example, the following aspects of
"quality of life :"
Standard of living: societies which produce in "excess" of
the minimum necessary for survival are more common and this
surplus manifests itself primarily in certain aspects of life, e.g.,
better housing, clothing, food, education, and health care.' 38
132. The difficulty here may be terminological. Hart may be saying only that:
(1) without life other goals are unimportant; or (2) compared to life other goals
exhibit less pattern or regularity. However, the first limit on the thrust of
Proposition M-1 (c) does not reflect the importance of "risk," i.e., other goals may
exhibit a pattern of more importance where the chance of achieving these goals is
great and the risk of death is small. If the second limitation is applicable, Hart
should have developed it explicitly and also considered the other patterns.
133. The argument is that: (1) the quality of housing, food, and clothing exceeds
the bare minimum for survival, and (2) that this qualitative excess is preferred
over "luxury" items like "color televisions." Empirical support is difficult to develop.
Modern "welfare" programs that provide goods in kind (e.g., food stamps, public
housing, public education, public hospitals) lend some support to the argument. See
generally, G. LENsKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE 37-41 (1966); P. SELZNiICK, LAW,
SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 3-34, 75-120 (1969). This view is also reflected
in the economic concept of "merit wants," which are desires,
considered so meritorious that their satisfaction is provided for through the
[Mierit
public budget, over and above what is provided through the market ....
wants include such items as publicly furnished school luncheons, subsidized lowcost housing, and free education.
R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 13 (1959) ; cf., J. RAWLS, A THEORY
(concept of "primary goods").
OF JUSTICE § 11, at 62 (1971)
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Aesthetic concerns: food, clothing, and housing take on the
dimensions of "gourmet" food, stylish dress, and architecturally
pleasing housing in nearly all societies. The content of aesthetics
may vary, but
strict, bare functionalism is not the common mode
1 34
of societies.
Personal concerns: nearly all legal systems recognize certain
personal relationships, e.g., marriage, blood kinship.' 35 It is at
least doubtful that such an overwhelming pattern can be explained solely on the basis that "survival" is furthered by these
personal relationships. Instead, the pattern suggests that there
is a personal, "quality of life" dimension common to all men.
Status, self-respect, and prestige are additional personal 3 dimensions of life which appear to be common human desires.1
Thus, Proposition M-3 (c) of Hart's model of man is open to serious
question in that it is inconsistent with a considerable amount of data.
How does traditional jurisprudence deal with this disparity between
his model and empirical data?
Turning initially to Hart, we find virtually no discussion of the
issue. This is, of course, disappointing. But, it is even more disconcerting that this omission has not been adequately analyzed by
Hart's jurisprudential critics. Some such critics have argued that
Proposition M-1 (c) ignores the empirical fact that men risk death
for a variety of goals. Lon Fuller, for example, refers to Aquinas'
remark that "if the highest aim of a captain were to preserve his ship,
he would keep it in port forever.' 37 However, Proposition M-l(a)
of Hart's model of man acknowledges the existence of other goals in
addition to survival. Thus, Hart would agree with Fuller's quotation
from Aquinas because Hart's point is not that there are no other goals,
but that there is no universal pattern in these other goals - some
men leave port for a religious pilgrimage, others for commerce.
Fuller's criticism does not controvert Hart's model because Fuller
does not distinguish between other individual goals and universal
goals. Not only does Fuller fail to confront the issue of the completeness of Hart's analysis of universal goals, he also perpetuates the basic
jurisprudential problem of "one man's theory. . . ." by countering
134. As with the prior argument, it is difficult to support the argument empirically
because the terminology is admittedly vague, e.g., what functionally superfluous characteristics of an object are aesthetic rather than merely accidental? However, the
statement seems to be at least as valid a truism as Hart's Proposition M-l(c).
135. Again empirical support is tenuous. However, the universality of the "law
of persons," i.e., the legal regulation of personal relationships such as marriage, is
reflected in anthropological studies. See, e.g., E. COrRAN & N. RUBIN, 2 READINGS
IN AFRICAN LAW (1969); E. HoFBEL, TIE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 285-86 (1954).
136. See, e.g., G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE 37-41 (1966).
137. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 185 (rev. ed. 1969).
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Hart's incomplete analysis with his own equally unsubstantiated
opinion that:

(1) the search for common goals may never be successful;'38
and
(2) "if we are forced to select the principle that supports and
infuses all human aspiration we would find it in the objective
of maintaining communication with our fellow man."1 9
Underlying the shortcomings of Hart's model of man are more
fundamental methodological deficiencies of jurisprudence. In particular, these are:
First, a preference for reliance on the "grand masters" rather
than empirical studies. For example, both Hart.4 and
Fuller' 4' refer to Aquinas in their analysis of the goals of
men and society, yet offer no basis for relying on him other
than his eminence in the field.
Second, the use of verbal models which increases the likelihood of

occasional misapplications of logic in constructing and criticizing models. 142
Third, a marked
lack of inhibition in offering unsubstantiated
43
opinions.1

Fourth, a metatheoretical vacuum in which "one man's
theory . . . ." is contrasted with "another man's theory"

to deal with the
and no objective criteria are ever 1advanced
44
issue of which theory is superior.
Given this pattern, it is not surprising that jurisprudence has not
progressed beyond "one man's theory ....
This situation is particularly disappointing because it is often
possible to reject the tradition of sterile scholasticism and go "look
in the horse's mouth to see how many teeth he has." For example,
cross-cultural comparisons, based on empirical studies of different
societies, could be used to detect patterns of goal orientation. Such
studies would present new difficulties; but attempts to construct a
"natural law" based on the "nature of man" would be more successful
138. Id.
139. Id. at 186.

140.

HART, CONCEPT 156, 187, 234, 251, 253, 254.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 185 (rev. ed.

141. L.

1969).

142. See text accompanying note 137 supra.

143. See note 138 and accompanying text supra.
144. See notes 27-32 and accompanying text supra. Fuller also omits any discussion
of this issue.
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if this approach were substituted for a reliance on the "grand masters"
like Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, and Hume.
The second proposition in the model of man is:
(M-2) Man is "rational" or "efficient" (more or less).
From a behavioral perspective, this proposition is necessarily intertwined with Proposition M-1, for if a man is irrational how can we
say that a pattern of seeking outcome A indicates that A is a goal?
He might be seeking B but is stupid, irrational, or grossly inefficient
in accomplishing his aim. Thus, Proposition M-2 is subject to the
same precautionary comments that accompanied Propositions M-1 (a)
and M-1(b), i.e., there is dissent which does not regard the proposition as an obvious truism and/or considers it beyond the proper
bounds of jurisprudential analysis.
In marked contrast, the following proposition is almost universally accepted as valid:
(M-3) Men are relatively equal in that they have common
limits on:
(a) their ability to protect themselves,
(b) their inclination to act altruistically,
(c) their ability to process information,
(d) their longevity,
(e) the material resources available to them for accomplishing goals, and
(f) their physical abilities.
However, the existence of the qualifying adverb "relatively" should
be noted because from another perspective men are relatively unequal.
There is a range of acts that no man can perform and men are equal
within this range, but within the range of human capability there
is considerable variation and inequality in "natural" capacities. Yet,
Hart never attempts to relate this aspect of human nature to his
145
model of law.

The final proposition in Hart's model of man is that:
(M-4) Man is uniquely capable of recognizing from an internal
perspective the "binding" nature of certain standards.
145. This qualification might be important in interpreting Proposition R-12.
Does mutuality of content refer to mutuality in terms of opportunity to seek gain
or in terms of actual substantive gain? If the first meaning is used, the effects of
relative inequality should perhaps be reflected in a model of law. For a discussion
of the ambiguities in Proposition R-12, see discussion accompanying notes 228-30
infra.
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This element of the model presents two difficulties. 1 46 First, there is
the problem of developing empirical tests to provide indirect evidence of
unobservable feelings. Verbal statements might provide the desired behavioral reference for determining whether men recognize a particular
standard as "binding." However, it is so difficult to use statements
as evidence of an internal state that this approach is only a partial
solution. 1 7 A second problem develops when the criterion of simplicity is considered because it is not clear what the concept of internal
recognition of "bindingness" adds to Hart's model of man. If it adds
little to our understanding of man, it may conflict with the simplicity
standard. Our attention should perhaps be addressed to direct, externally visible phenomena rather than to invisible, internal "feelings,"
which can only be indirectly studied. 14 A resolution of these problems
is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, this element in
Hart's model of man is particularly questionable when viewed in terms
of the criteria discussed above; therefore, any aspects of his model
of law which are based on this proposition are similarly suspect. (See
discussion below in section on the "internal aspect" of rules).
b. Model of Society
The propositions in Hart's model of society are:
(S-1)

Social effort is more "efficient" than individual effort.

(S-2) Dynamic societies are more "efficient" than static societies.
(S-3)

Societies with a division or specialization of labor are
more "efficient" than societies where all men do the same
work. Therefore, societies with "legal specialists" ("officials") are more "efficient" than societies without
''officials."

(S-4) Societies require a certain minimum level of order or
co-ordination.
The last proposition is a definitional requirement: if the minimum
does not exist, then we say the society has collapsed or disintegrated.
It is included explicitly because of its importance in developing the
model of law.
146. These difficulties underlie the earlier criticisms (discussed in text preceding
note 129) of models of man which include elements like Proposition M-1.
147. For a discussion of the difficulties of using verbal statements as evidence
of an internal state, see G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITs ELEMENTARY FORMS 26577 (1961). For an example of a survey of internal feelings of obligation to obey the
law, see Sarat, Support for the Legal System, 3 AM. POL. Q. 3 (1975).
148. See notes 129-31 supra.
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Hart's analysis here is clearly "functionalist": he is asserting
that social arrangements have a function. 149 Moreover, he is explicitly
ascribing two such functions to social ordering:
(1) Furthering the survival of individuals (Proposition
M-1).
(2) Furthering the survival of society (Proposition S-4;
Propositions R-4, R-5).
Although there are numerous advantages to such an approach, Hart's
societal model is subject to a number of criticisms.
The first criticism concerns his ambiguous description of the
functions. For example, how is society defined? Does a sudden social
change so alter the pattern that the society has ended? Or, if society
is defined in terms of its members, does the death of half of them
mean the end, at least in part, of the society ?150 The temporal aspects
of individual survival also present problems. For example, is the
survival of unborn individuals included? If not, is Hart excluding
any goal of survival of the species ?'
The second criticism is purely logical in nature; it would seem
that there are situations where the two functions listed above could
conflict. However, Hart never reveals any awareness of such a potential conflict even though the concept of efficiency becomes highly questionable when such societal goals are conflicting. For example, Hart
asserts:
It is plain that only a small community closely knit by ties of
kinship, common sentiment, and belief, and placed in a stable
environment, could live successfully by such a r~gime of unofficial
[i.e., only primary] rules. In any other conditions such a simple
form of social control must prove defective and will require
supplementation in different ways.' 52
Hart then suggests various remedies. Considerable care, however,
must be used in analyzing these additions: it does not necessarily
follow that large societies improve the individual's chances of survival. For example, a particular type of small, simple society may
be more efficient at promoting human survival than some large complex society. In such a case, the larger society would be less efficient
than the smaller one in achieving human survival, although it may be
149. For a general discussion of "functionalism," see
(D. Martindale ed. 1965).

FUNCTIONALISM

IN

THE

NATURAL

L.F.

SOCIAL SCIENCES

150. For a discussion of this problem, see Noonan, Book Review, 7
169, 175 (1962).
151. See note 153 infra.
152. HART, CONCEPT 89-90.
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more efficient in accomplishing the perpetuation of a particular form
of society.' 53 The analysis of "efficiency" becomes even more complex
when goals other than human survival are included.'
Such complications can occur even where Hart's limited statement of alterna155
tive goals (Proposition M-1) is adopted.
The other criticisms of Hart's model, which can be directed at
most functional models of society, include the following :'
(1) A "conservative" bias resulting from (a) a concern
with order and function rather than with change and dysfunction,
and (b) an acceptance of functions as given rather than as
dependent variables. 5 '
(2) A vagueness in the future-oriented concepts of function and purpose that makes empirical studies extremely difficult
(if not impossible). 5 s
(3) A difficulty in developing a theory of social (and legal)
change which can do more than identify changes after they have
occurred.
(4) A focus on "closed systems"
systems."

rather than on "open

Hart, of course, never claimed to be developing a model which would
satisfy such criticisms. Nevertheless, an adequate analysis of his
model should include a reference to the limits of his underlying model
of society.
153. The goal of survival of the individual or of the society could also conflict
with survival of the species. Consider, for example, infanticide of defective newborns.
See, e.g., B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 175-83 (1971).
154. For a discussion of other goals which are at least exhibited in many
societies, see text accompanying notes 133-36 supra.
155. For example, even if all societies shared only the goal of survival, a
particular society could have a unique social goal (e.g., religious purity, world
conquest) which conflicted with survival.
156. For discussion of these types of criticism, see Martindale, Limits of and
Alternatives to Functionalismin Sociology, in FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
144, 156-60 (D. Martindale ed. 1965) ; Whitaker, The Nature and Value of Functionalism in Sociology, id. at 127, 139-43.
157. The following are examples of the effects of this "conservative bias" on
Hart's models:
(1) Although recognizing that survival is only one function, Hart does not
deal with the problems of a shift in the relative importance of various functions.
See notes 150-53 and accompanying text supra.
(2) The exclusion of morality and justice from his model. See notes 107-21
supra. Such considerations are often included in models that focus on change.
See, e.g., P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969).
158. See text accompanying notes 129-31 supra, for reference to the problems
of purposiveness in Hart's model of man. The empirical problems of examining
societies rather than individuals render the implementation of research based on
purposive models of society even more difficult.
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The first three criticisms do not require elaboration. However,
the fourth merits further discussion. The following passage illustrates
the distinction between open and closed systems:
Open and Closed Systems. Most organic systems are open, meaning they exchange materials, energies, or information with their
environments. A system is closed if there is no import or export
of energies in any of its forms such as information, heat, physical
materials, etc., and therefore no change of components, an example being a chemical reaction taking place in a sealed insulated
container. An open system becomes closed if ingress or egress
of energies is cut off.
Whether a given system is open or closed depends on how much
of the universe is included in the system and how much in the
environment. By adjoining to the system that part of the environment with which an exchange takes place, the system becomes
closed.15 9
Hart's model of law is an example of a closed system. In the schematic
presentation of the model in Diagram 1 (page 65), there are no
arrows indicating exchanges with the environment. Although Hart
recognizes interaction with the environment (for example, morality
"influences" law (Proposition R-14)), the focus of his model is on
the closed-system aspects of law. The importance of such a closed
model will be discussed in the later analysis of exclusions from his
model of law.
Despite all these criticisms, functional models of society have
considerable utility in analyzing social behavior. 6 ° The primary
strength of the approach lies in the fact that society is viewed as a
whole system, thereby compelling analysis of the structural interrelationships among its components. For example, a non-functionalist
legal theorist could ignore the relationship between the legal subsystem and other social institutions. A functionalist like Hart, however, views the entire social system and attempts to determine the
relationship of law to the other subsystems as well as to the social
system as a whole. One may criticize Hart's resolution of the attempt, but the task is certainly worthwhile. Likewise, the above
discussion of the limits of functionalism should not be construed as
159. Hall & Fagen, Definition of a System, in MODERN SYSTEMS RESEARCH IOR
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 81, 86-87 (W. Buckley ed. 1968) (emphasis in original).
For further authorities discussing systems concepts, see note 210.
160. For discussions of the strengths of functional models, see Martindale, Limits
of and Alternatives to Functionalism in Sociology, in FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 144, 156-60 (D. Martindale ed. 1965); Whitaker, The Nature and Value
of Functionalismin Sociology, id. at 127, 143.
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an argument for the rejection of such an approach. Instead, the
criticisms are offered as precautionary warnings of its underlying
assumptions and of the limiting factors to be considered in using such
models.
3. The Model of Law -

Law as Rules

The following discussion analyzes both Hart's model of law and
the general nature of jurisprudential comment on his work. The latter
analysis is accomplished by examining some criticisms of Hart's
model in order to demonstrate his critics' lack of concern with criteria
for comparing jurisprudential models and to illustrate the advantages
of the proposed criteria in evaluating jurisprudential theories.
a. The nature of rules
i. The "internal aspect" of rules
Hart defines a rule in terms of four variables: (1) communication,
(2) internal awareness, (3) behavior conformity, and (4) effect of
breach. Using these variables, the following proposition emerges:
(R-2) A rule:
(a) requires:
(1) A "communication" of a prescribed standard of
conduct (See Proposition R-3(a) below), and,
(2) An internal attitude manifested as an awareness
of the "binding" nature of the standard.
(b) is usually (but not always) accompanied by a pattern of behavior in conformity with the rule. (However, see Proposition R-5 below).
(c) deals with breach of the rule as follows:
(1) The formal declaration
(a) of a primary rule will usually (but not
always) provide a penalty for breach;
(b) of a secondary rule will always provide
that a breach results in nullity.
(2) The actual enforcement for breach of rules will
usually (but not always) conform with the
declaration.
Using the metatheoretical perspective developed in this article,1 6' the
principal problem with the definition is the "internal aspect" of rules.
(Proposition R-2 (a)(2)). This internal recognition of "binding161. See text accompanying notes 8-18 supra.
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ness" cannot be observed, so an empirically oriented jurisprudent
would hesitate to include it in 'a model of law. 1 62 Hart argues, nonetheless, that this internal aspect is a necessary element in a model of
law because:
(1) A "proper" organizational model of law should distinguish
between:
(a) behavior in response to "mere" force (e.g., a gunman)
as opposed to behavior in response to a "proper" legal
rule (e.g., a statute) ;163 and,
(b) patterns of behavior based on rules as opposed to mere
patterns of conduct (e.g., habit).'"
It is necessary to analyze rules from the perspective of those
subject to them, an approach which includes consideration
of the individual's internal awareness. 6 But why is this typology crucial to a jurisprudential model?
Hart asserts that the classification issues are important because
"[s]peculation about the nature of law . .. has centered almost conHart derives his issues from
tinuously upon [such issues.]""'
tradition rather than from some purposive or functional structure such
as: "This organization is important because it has the ability to
accomplish the following functions.116 7 Thus, Hart's organizational
structure appeals primarily to those who accept the traditional formulation of jurisprudential issues.
However, even if one accepts the importance of the distinction, a
second problem remains because law can be distinguished from force
and habit by characteristics other than the internal perspective. For
example, "mere" force could be said to exist where the rule is not
followed as soon as the threat is removed. 16 8 Habit can be distinguished from rules by reference to two empirical phenomena: (1) the
communication of a standard of conduct (see Proposition R-2 (a)
(2)

162. See note 18 and accompanying text supra. Cf. analysis of Proposition M-4
at notes 129-31 and accompanying text supra. This earlier discussion concerned the
issue of whether goals and rationality could be phrased in terms of objectively
observable empirical facts. This is not the same as that raised in the text above
by Hart's argument that admittedly unobservable elements should be included in a
model. Cf. text accompanying notes 198-201 infra.
163. HART, CONCEPT 6-7, 18-25.
164. Id. at 54-60.
165. Id. at 55-57, 85-88, 96, 134-37, 244.
166. Id. at 6. See id. at 13.
167. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
168. Cf. J. MILLENSON, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS 89-114 (1967).
See note 172 and accompanying text infra. It might be helpful to compare Hart's
perspective with B. F. Skinner's, as formulated in B. F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM
AND DIGNITY (1971).
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(1)); and (2) acknowledgement of that standard by those following
it, by those criticizing deviations from it, and/or by those whose
deviations are criticized.' 69 If repetitive behavior exists without these
phenomena, then the behavior pattern is not -the result of a rule.'
Thus, objective external variables could be used to make the distinc7
tions which Hart insists must be made.1 1
Even though empirical definitions of rule-oriented patterns of
behavior can be devised, Hart would object to the exclusion of the
internal element. 1 2 This objection results from Hart's insistence that
rules be viewed from the perspective of those affected. This argument
has a certain appeal since we are all personally affected by rules.
However, it should be noted that Hart does not face the issue of why
such a perspective is "necessary." He only says that without it our
model is "incomplete" because one who observes only external
variables "will miss out a whole dimension of the social life of those
whom he is watching."' 173 Perhaps this is true, but it is not possible to
develop a general model or concept of law without excluding some
dimensions of the observed social life. (Proposition M-3 (c)). Even
if we limited ourselves to only one society, we could not include all the
dimensions.

174

Moreover, even if this dimension (rather than others) is necessary, a further problem remains. A general classification which includes legal systems in different societies requires general, crosscultural categories or "boxes" to hold the data to be organized. But
169. Hart utilizes this distinction:
[F]or the group to have a habit it is enough that their behaviour in fact
converges. Deviation from the regular course need not be a matter for any
form of criticism. But such general convergence or even identity of behaviour is
not enough to constitute the existence of a rule requiring that behaviour: where
there is such a rule deviations are generally regarded as lapses or faults open
to criticism, and threatened deviations meet with pressure for conformity, though
the forms of criticism and pressure differ with different types of rules.
HART, CONCEPT 54 (emphasis in original). However, he adds other distinctions based
on the "internal aspect" of rules. See note 172 and accompanying text infra.

170. Hart notes:
There is certainly one point of similarity between social rules and habits:

in both cases the behaviour in question (e.g. baring the head in church) must
be general though not necessarily invariable; this means that it is repeated when
occasion arises by most of the group: so much is, as we have said, implied in
the phrase, 'They do it as a rule.'
HART, CONCEPT 54 (emphasis in original). The two variables referred to in the text
would enable us to determine whether repetitive behavior results from rules.
171. See note 18 and accompanying text supra, and note 178 infra.
172. See text accompanying note 165 supra; HART, CONCEPT 54-55 (rule/habit

distinction requires consideration of "internal aspect").
173. HART, CONCEPT 87.
174. See notes 232-34 and accompanying text infra.
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a member of an African tribal society may have a perspective on rules
that is different from that of an Englishman. A focus on internal
perspectives thus raises fundamental questions about our ability to
make meaningful comparisons of culturally determined internal perspectives. If each culture is somehow unique, then internal perspectives
may also be unique and, therefore, incapable of comparison .175 In
other words, once one starts down the road of "looking inside people,"
how far does one go? How is the stopping point determined?
A final problem with Hart's inclusion of the internal aspect of
rules in his model is the manner in which the argument is structured.
Although Hart generally is very careful to avoid any assertions
regarding the "essence" of law,'1 7 his use of such terms as "necessary"
and "crucial" in the analysis of the internal aspect suggest that he
regards this aspect as "essential." However, as this article has attempted to demonstrate, no element in a model can be termed
''essential" until one has first indicated the purpose of the model and
then shown that this purpose cannot be fulfilled without including
the particular element. In this limited sense an element can be said
to be "essential." Using this definition, the internal aspect is not
"Cessential" to Hart's organizational scheme because alternative classification models using only external data can be proposed. 7 7 If an
analysis of the internal perspective is a function of a model, then the
internal aspect is, of course, essential. But this essentially is tautological, not functional, because the "need" for the element has been
included in the definition of the task.
On the other hand, "nonessentiality" is also a relative concept.
Thus, there has been no attempt to show that Hart is "wrong" in
including the internal aspect or that the internal aspect is "mythical"
or nonexistent. 17 1 Instead, the discussion illustrates the proposed
metatheoretical perspective by showing, first, the reasons for hesitating
175. See LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 2-7, 337-48 (L. Nader ed. 1972);
Bahannon, Ethnography and Comparison in Legal Anthropology, id. at 401; Gluckman,
Concepts in the Comparative Study of Tribal Law, id. at 349; March, Book Review,
8 STAN. L. REv. 499 (1956).
176. But see HART, CONCEPT 151: [T]he "union [of primary and secondary

rules] may be justly regarded as the 'essence' of law. . "
177. See text accompanying note 168 supra.
178. See, e.g., I. LITTLE, WELFARE ECONOMICs 54-55 (2d ed. 1957), who argues
that to deny interpersonal comparisons is the equivalent of denying the existence of
minds and internal feelings; see also P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE

(1958).
The point in the text is not that the internal aspect is unreal or nonexistent
but rather that it is difficult to reach objective agreement concerning such a
phenomenon because the observable evidence is so indirect. For authorities discussing

this problem, see notes 147 & 175 supra.
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to include it in a model of law, and, second, the considerations necessary if the element is included.
ii.

The "open texture" of rules

The second element in Hart's model of law as rules is:
(R-3) The symbolic component of a rule will
(a) usually be communicated
(1) to those affected;
(2) prior to the conduct involved; and
(3) in a form
(A) that is intelligible to those affected; and
(B) that refers to general classes of persons
and conduct.
(b) always be "open-textured" - i.e., of the set of
"possible behavior" there will be three subsets:
(1) A "closed" subset of behavior which is clearly
included;
(2) A "closed" subset of behavior which is clearly
excluded;
(3) An "open" subset of behavior which is not
clearly included or excluded. (This conflicts
with Proposition R-3(a) (2), (3) (A), but is
necessitated by Propositions M-3(c) and R-3
(a)(3)(B)).
This proposition is based primarily upon that part of Hart's model
of man which asserts that men have common limits in their ability
to process information. (Proposition M-3(c)). Once this component
in the model of man has been accepted, the communication elements
in Hart's model of rules are similarly acceptable from the proposed
metatheoretic perspective. Nevertheless, two points should be discussed.
First, Hart's analysis of open texture is "formal" because his
model addresses only the apparent coverage or scope of the rules rather
than their actual application. A situation may be clearly included
in the formal language of a rule; but the situation might not actually
be included if, for example, the rule is changed, violated, or mistakenly applied (or "bent" severely) by a court, by an enforcement
agency, or by the person involved. (Compare Proposition R-2 (b) &
(c)). Thus, to say that a given form of behavior is clearly within
the rule (i.e., it is not within the open-textured set or the clearly
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excluded set), is not the same as predicting that the rule will in fact
influence the behavior either of a citizen or of an official. The principal
difference between a "formal" and a "predictive" conception of rules
is that, from the latter perspective, rules can affect only the degree
of certainty (i.e., probability) of coverage or exclusion: there is
never certainty since there is always the possibility of abuse, change,
error, or other aberrations. Of course, in Hart's system the existence
of a legal system necessarily entails a significant factual correlation
between rules and behavior. (See Proposition R-5 (a) (1)). Nevertheless this correlation is reflected only in reduced uncertainty: there
are never situations where one can predict with 100% certainty that
behavior will in fact be excluded or included in the application of the
rule. Yet Hart contemplates just such certainty in his "formal"
concept of the open texture of rules.
There is, of course, nothing wrong in the abstract with a formal
model which says that a rule is a rule even if broken or misapplied
(Proposition R-1 (b)) and that the rule certainly covers a specific
behavior even if not in fact applied to that behavior (Proposition
R-2(b), (c) (2)). Indeed, such analysis can be extremely useful
in performing such important tasks as the determination of whether
the content of a rule has changed. 7 9 The point is that such formal
models are limited to formal analysis and may be of limited utility
in behavioral analysis.

The second point concerning Hart's analysis of open texture is
the lack of any elements in the model that relate to the exercise of
"discretion" within the open-textured area: there is no concern with
the actual exercise of the powers granted to "officials" by secondary
rules. Since the exclusions from Hart's model will be discussed in
detail in a later section, it is sufficient for the purpose of this section
to indicate the lack of any element relating to this aspect of a legal
system.
iii.
The "types" of rules

Hart asserts that a model which treats all rules the same "distorts" reality and that, therefore, rules should be distinguished as
follows :
(R-1) Rules can be divided into two basic types:
(a) Primary rules which dictate certain behavior patterns and which usually, but not necessarily, provide
that sanctions will be imposed for breach of the rule;
179.

HART, CONCEPT

141.
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(b) Secondary rules which
(1) confer "power":
(A) to create primary rules or subordinate
secondary rules;
(B) to interpret primary rules;
(C) to apply primary rules to facts; and
(D) to apply sanctions for breach of primary
rules; and,
(2) nullify the attempted exercise of power if the
rule is not followed.
Hart is here proposing a classification model which will "fit" the real
world with varying degrees of accuracy."' 0
This taxonomic scheme presents two fundamental problems.
First, it is not always clear what phenomena in the "real world" are
contemplated by Hart. For example, he identifies a number of items
which are involved in the concept of a "legal sanction":
(1) a sanction is an evil,' and/or a threat of retribution or
recompense of any sort which can be used to coerce behavior, 8 2 and

(2) a sanction is imposed as a punishment' 3 or remedy for the
breach of a duty. 8 4
He also notes that certain governmental actions are not sanctions,
83
for example, the nullification of the attempted exercise of a power
and the imposition of taxes.'8 6 A large number of varying empirical
phenomena are thus categorized, yet their interrelations are not made
clear.

87

The second fundamental difficulty with Hart's typology of rules
is his failure to justify his preference for this form of organization
180. See text accompanying notes 14 & 21-24 supra.

181. HART, CONCEPT 33, 34.
182. Id. at 16-25, 27, 33, 34, 48.
183. Id. at 27, 33.
184. Id. at 27, 32-33, 39-40, 68-69, 95.
185. Id. at 33-35, 68-69.
186. Id. at 39.
187. The difficulties arising from this lack of clarity are vividly illustrated when
one attempts to classify the following examples as primary or secondary rules:
(1) Employers who hire and train unskilled workers are eligible for certain ax
deductions, cf. HART, CONcEPT 39; and, (2) Contracts resulting from the fraud of
one party are voidable by the other. See id. at 85. For discussion of similar difficulties
with Hart's model, see note 192 infra.
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over some other classification.18 Such other typologies, for example,
might be:
(1) A division of rules into property rules, liability (tort) rules,
and inalienability rules (conferring rights and duties which
which cannot be exchanged) .189
(2) A division of rules into formal, "public" rules and informal,
"private" rules.190
(3) A division of rules into strategic (or constitutive)
tactical.'

and

Hart does assert that the following "test" supports his distinction
between primary and secondary rules:
[P]ower-conferring [secondary] rules are thought of, spoken of,
and used in social life differently from rules which impose duties,
and they are valued for different reasons. What other tests for
difference in character could there be? 9 '
But, since this same common-usage test also supports the alternative
typologies of rules listed above, it is too imprecise and variable to serve
as a standard. 9"
These various rule-classification models cannot be compared until
one has first postulated a function for the model. Hart's classifica188. For a general discussion of Hart's failure to develop criteria for justifying
his classification scheme, see text accompanying notes 23-32 supra.
189. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
190. E.g., F. BAILEY, STRATAGEMS AND SPoILs: A SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF
POLITICS (1969).
191. E.g., J.BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962);
Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 362,
385-86 (1971). This typology is, of course, similar to Hart's distinction between the
"rule of recognition" as a basic or constitutive rule or set of rules and the other
rules of a legal system. However, these concepts are different from Hart's because
they emphasize the relative importance of the rules and do not add a requirement
of behavior conformity. See Proposition R-5 (a).
192. HART, CONCEPT 41 (emphasis added).
193. The shortcomings of employing the common-usage test to justify Hart's
typology might be better understood by noting how his system fails to meet this test.
For example,
(a) Persons normally view the loss of a reward as a sanction, yet denying
the grant of a "reward" might not be a sanction in Hart's system. See example
(1) in note 187 supra.
(b) Persons differentiate between punitive damages and compensatory damages as remedies, yet Hart's system fails to so distinguish them. See HART,
CONCEPT 85; cf. id.at 27.
Hart himself recognized similar shortcomings of this test when talking about
"classifying" law. See text accompanying note 218 infra.
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tion scheme may be very useful not only to traditional legal scholarship'
but also to behavioral studies. 95 Nevertheless, its utility is
relative to the purposes at hand. Viewed from this functional perspective, Hart's distinction between primary and secondary rules may
be more than just "one man's theory. . . ." At the same time, however,
it is something less than the "key to the science of jurisprudence. 19 6
b. Patterns or formal structure of rules and legal systems in
society.
The first proposition in Hart's formal analysis of the structure of
rules in society is:
(R-4) Societies must have rules.
Since this proposition is meant to be a statement of empirical fact,
its "validity" depends largely on the accuracy of the underlying
assertions that:
(1)

Society requires a minimum of order.

(Proposition S-4).

(2) This order requires communication among society's members; and, because of man's limited ability to process information
(Proposition M-3(c)), these communications must be generalized to some extent. (Proposition R-3 (a) (3) (B)).
(3) Because of limits on man's altruism, this order must be
imposed where self-interest conflicts with societal order. (Proposition M-3(b); Propositions R-3(a) & R-11).
(4) Given common limits on the ability of men to impose their
will on one another (see Proposition M-3), mere coercion is
not sufficient to establish a legal order. In addition, there must
be a sense of internal obligation to conform behavior to the
system of rules.' 97
The first three assertions are consistent with the valid elements of
Hart's underlying models of society and man. Consequently, if Proposition R-4 relied only on these assertions, it would be unobjectionable.
194. See note 258 and the text accompanying notes 258--63 infra.

195. Cf. L.

NADER,

LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY

2-4 (1969), which contains a

discussion of the use of the classification scheme presented in Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), 26 YALE
L.J. 710 (1917). Hohfeld's system is used by E. Adamson Hoebel in his anthropological

study of primative social systems,

THE LAW

OF

PRIMATIVE

MAN

(1954).

Hart's

system could be used in a similar manner. Another illustration of the use of the
distinction between primary rules and secondary rules is developed at text accompanying notes 210-16 infra.
196. HART, CONCEPT 79; see note 32 supra.
197. See discussion in note 73 supra.
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However, since Hart's definition of a rule includes an internal aspect
(Proposition R-2 (a)(2); Proposition R-5 (a)(2)(B)), the fourth
assertion is necessary to support Proposition R-4. Within that assertion the contention that there are limits on coercion is unexceptional;
but, the additional statement that coercion is always supplemented
in part by an internal sense of obligation poses problems. There are
alternative methods of maintaining order that do not rely on a sense
of obligation. 9 ' Indeed, Hart himself recognizes such alternatives:
It is often said that a legal system must rest on a sense of
moral obligation or on the conviction of the moral value of the
system, since it does not and cannot rest on mere power of man
over man .... But the dichotomy of 'law based merely on power'

and 'law which is accepted as morally binding' is not exhaustive.
Not only may vast numbers be coerced by laws which they do not
regard as morally binding, but it is not even true that those
who do accept the system voluntarily, must conceive of themselves as morally bound to do so, though the system will be most
stable when they do so. In fact, their allegiance to the system
may be based on many different considerations: calculations of
long-term interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as
others do. There is indeed no reason why those who accept
the authority of the system should not examine their conscience
and decide that, morally, they ought not to accept it, yet for a
variety of reasons continue to do so.' 9 9

However, Hart does not consider the role that these alternatives
could play in supplementing coercive power even though such a consideration is crucial to his argument. Without such a consideration,
Hart shows only that rules, defined to include an internal sense of
obligation, could provide the requisite social order by supplementing
coercion with obligation; he does not show that no other methods
could be used. Thus, Hart fails to demonstrate that "rules .. .must

be the main instrument of social control, ' 2 00 because the prerequisite
of social order (Proposition S-4) could arguably be provided by
coercion, supplemented by considerations other than internal acceptance.
i.

The "Rule of Recognition"

The satisfaction of the minimal-societal-order requirement of
Proposition S-4 requires that the rules in a society must have some
198. For a discussion of possible alternative explanations, see Austin, The Province
of Jurisprudence Determined, in JURISPRUDENCE 573-74 (G. Christie ed. 1973).
199. HART, CONCEPT 198-99.
200, Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
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minimal consistency. Hart asserts that this coherence is achieved by
a "rule of recognition":
(R-5) Legal rules are unified into a system by a "rule of recognition" which is a type of secondary rule authorizing
certain persons ("officials") to exercise various powers
in a consistent, systematic manner. (See Proposition
R-1 (b).)
(a) The rule of recognition has two dimensions:
(1) A minimal level of obedience by citizens to the
rules promulgated by the "officials" identified
by the rule; and
(2) A shared acceptance by the "officials" of the rule
of recognition. Such "acceptance" is manifested
by
(A) a minimal level of obedience to the rule
of recognition in exercising their power
under the rule,
(B) an internal awareness of the binding nature
of the rule, and
(C) external references to the rule.
(b) The rule of recognition is developed over time as the
above pattern of obedience and acceptance manifests
itself. Therefore,
(1) it can only be identified retrospectively, and
(2) changes over a short period of time do not
affect it.
There are many difficulties with this concept. Problems arise
initially because the "rule of recognition" does not meet all of Hart's
requirements for a rule.2 ' Hart defines a rule in terms of a number
of variables (Proposition R-1), one of which is that there be an
internal awareness of the "binding" nature of the rule. (Proposition
R-1 (a) (2)). However, this internal aspect presents a problem
here because many citizens may be unaware of the rule of recognition. Hart nimbly sidesteps this problem by requiring that only
"officials" have this internal awareness. (Proposition R-5 (a) (2)
201. Hart has indicated an awareness of this problem and suggested that the
rule of recognition is in many ways more like a moral rule than a legal rule. Hart,
Book Review, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1294 (1965). Apparently the reference is to
that aspect of Hart's model which asserts that moral rules, like the rule of recognition,
are immune from deliberate change, i.e., both are defined in part by the sum of the
behaviors of a group of individuals over time. See HART, CONCEPT 171-73; Proposition
R-5; text accompanying note 117 supra; APPENDIX 2 infra.
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(B)). Thus, the formal definition of a rule has been modified considerably. Further modification occurs when Hart asserts that the
rule of recognition requires a pattern of obedience to and by "officials."
(Proposition R-5 (a)). No other rule requires such a behavioral
conformity. (See Proposition R-1 (b) (2)). Insofar as the "rule of
recognition" has these unique features, it is highly questionable
whether it should be called a rule.
It would be more accurate to term the rule of recognition a
hypothetical construct which refers to the apparent "fact" that :202
(1) Systematic geographical and temporal patterns of "legal"
behavior exist that cannot be explained by reference to a rule
from an "official."
(2) These patterns may be correlated with external references
to a standard requiring such pattern and an internal concern on
the part of some persons that the pattern "should" not vary,
that such variation "should be" criticized, and that such criticisms
are "justified."
Distilling these patterns into a concept like "rule of recognition" may
be a necessary part of a classification scheme: there is a set of facts
that needs an appropriately labeled "box." There are considerable
problems, however, in using this crude classification model to analyze
specific societies. For example, suppose one. wanted to determine
03
the rule of recognition (if there is one) in Northern Ireland today.1
202. The factual patterns may also be correlated with a written document, e.g.,
a constitution. See note 89 supra. However, the constitution can be called the rule of
recognition only when its acceptance is reflected by the requisite factual patterns of
behavior and internal awareness. Political scientists have noted a pattern, similar to
the rule of recognition, in which basic norms of proper decisionmaking are shared
by "elites" while the general populace lacks any consensus on such norms. See
Lawrence, ProceduralNorms and Tolerance: A Reassessment, 70 Am. POL. Sci. REv.
80, 82-83 (1976) ; but see id. at 83-100.
203. APPENDix 2 to this article indicates the process necessary to answer this
question if we treat it as a factual issue. Although Hart refers to the identification
of the rule of recognition as (at least in part) an "essentially factual" determination,
HART, CONCEPT 106, he also refers to certain circumstances where the officials of a
particular legal system may ignore this aspect of the rule of recognition by simply
"bypassing" the factual determination of "validity." Id. at 115-16; see id. at 105.
For example, there is nothing constraining an American court from determining the
validity of a particular law of Northern Ireland without undertaking a factual
inquiry like that developed in APPENDIX 2. However, in such a case, a proper
statement of the situation would be that the American - and not the Northern
Irish - rule of recognition had conferred validity on the law. See id. at 105 (first
supposition). It is also true that a court in Ulster might similarly determine that
the law is valid under the Northern Irish rule of recognition without making a
factual inquiry. But such a determination involves only the official-acceptance aspect
of the rule of recognition. See Proposition R-5(a) (2). If the Northern Irish people
reject this official version, then the rule of recognition does not regard the "law"
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This process requires not only the development of further concepts
ignored by Hart,2 4 but also the gathering and processing of vast
amounts of data.2" 5 If these obstacles could be overcome, what exactly
would one learn about Northern Ireland? Would this knowledge be
worth the effort? If not, then the concept of "rule of recognition"
should not be used as a classification device for analyzing empirical
situations because it violates the simplicity criterion,20 6 i.e., it does
not include sufficient information about the real world to justify its
inclusion in the model. The point here is not that the rule of recognition is wrong, but rather, that its utility from a metatheoretic perspective is questionable.
ii. The "elements" of law in a developed legal system
Hart distinguishes between primitive societies with few, if any,
secondary rules and developed societies with numerous such rules.
He then proposes the following proposition to compare the two types
of societies:

(R-6) Secondary rules make it possible for society to be
dynamic and to have legal "officials." (Proposition R-1).
Therefore, societies with such rules are more "efficient"
than societies without them. (Propositions S-2 & S-3).
This proposition, which is based on Hart's functional model of society,
is subject not only to the shortcomings of such models 20 7 but also to
the criticism that Hart's particular functional model is potentially
inconsistent insofar as it refers to a society with a lack of secondary

as valid. See Proposition R-5(a)(1). At the same time, by rejecting the official
version, the populace has simultaneously refused to authorize the officials' act of
interpretation. This refusal also defines the content of the rule of recognition but from
a different perspective: the officials are not empowered by the rule of recognition
(1) to interpret the rule of recognition concerning this rule; or (2) to interpret the
rule of recognition in this manner.
204. See note 53 supra. The ambiguity is illustrated by considering whether
or not, in Diagram 1, the testator is an "official" because he is exercising power
conferred by a secondary rule. See note 92 supra. Legal realists have also encountered
problems with defining "officials." Rumble, Law as the Effective Decisions of
Officials: A "New Look" at Legal Realism, 20 J. PUB. L. 216, 224-26 (1971).
205. For example, since Northern Ireland appears to be a partly pathological
system, it will be necessary to distinguish laws regulating deeds and wills from
laws regulating the use of physical force. Moreover, it will be necessary to
distinguish among the various segments of the populations, e.g., rebels (of one sort
or another) vis-a-vis citizens willing to recognize all laws. See generally HART,
CONCEPT 114-20.
206. See text following note 18 supra.
207. See text accompanying notes 149-59 supra.
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rules as "defective. ' 20 8 However, the latter criticism can be avoided
by eliminating such reference, and the limits of functional models are
countered by their strengths. Proposition R-6, therefore, is useful
so long as the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying model of
society are kept in mind. 0 9
Moreover, these concepts are highly compatible with the purposed metatheoretical perspective because they parallel statements of
several "cybernetic" principles. Cybernetics is variously defined, but
basically it is concerned with the interrelation of the variables of information, communication, and regulation or control of systems. 210 Because cybernetic analysis attempts to make "predictive" statements
about these relationships, it is a "higher order" theory than Hart's
21
classification model. '
Consequently, it is fruitful to consider Hart's model from this
perspective in order to demonstrate how a classification model can be
modified to fulfill at least some of the "higher order" predictive functions. One example of a predictive cybernetic statement is the following:
(C-i) If the variety of behavior to be regulated exceeds the
ability of the regulator to process information concerning
such variety,
then there will be at least a partial failure of
2 12
regulation.
For example, since the variety of behavior possible with 1000 citizens
exceeds the ability of one person, Rex, to process information about
those 1000 individuals, a possible failure in regulation can be predicted. This is, of course, very similar to Hart's Proposition M-3(c).
However, by explicitly including a predictive capability, the cybernetic perspective goes beyond Hart.
Before presenting more cybernetic principles, further development of Hart's concept of a secondary rule is necessary. In a system
with no secondary rules, all persons in the society would be relatively
208. See text accompanying notes 152-53 supra.
209. See text accompanying note 160 supra, and sources cited therein.

210. A good introduction to cybernetics (which is sometimes called "systems
analysis") is W. ASHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS (1963). There are
numerous other works in the field ranging from the very general, e.g., N. WEINER,
THE HUMAN USE OF HUMAN BEINGS: CYBERNETICS AND SOCIETY (1954), to the
extremely complex, e.g., M. MESAROVIc, D. MACKO, & Y. TAKAHARA, THEORY OF
HIERARCHICAL, MULTILEVEL SYSTEMS 34-65 (1970). A more complete bibliography
concerning both cybernetics and various related perspectives is found in Cowan,
Decision Theory in Law, Science and Technology, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 499, 525-30
(1963).
211. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
212. See, e.g., W. ASHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS § 11/6 (1963).
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equal in their ability (or lack of ability) to declare and identify rules,
make rules, interpret rules, apply rules and impose sanctions. (Proposition M-3). In this system, control of concerted social action can be
said to be diffused through society, and change is assured only when
unanimity is approached. In a system with secondary rules which
grant certain persons in the society relatively more power than other
citizens, a hierarchical pattern emerges.213 Diffused and hierarchical
patterns can be compared by use of the following additional cybernetic
propositions:
(C-2) Where a diffused pattern of social control is used, there
is a clear, finite limit on information processing because
all or nearly all individuals must process the information
so that unanimity can be approached. 14 Thus, even with
simultaneous communication, the total society is still
limited to the amount of information that one person can
process.
(C-3)

The larger the group, the more difficult it is to reach
unanimity, because:
(a) The time required for nearly all persons to process
the information increases with the size of society
unless it is technologically possible for all or nearly
all persons to approach simultaneous communication
regardless of size.
(b) People may have conflicting goals and, therefore, be
unable to approach unanimity on an issue. The likelihood of such goal conflict increases as size increases.
(c) The equality necessary for diffused control is always
threatened by the possibility of some inequalities2 1

213. For a discussion of typologies similar to that developed in the text, see R.
BENDIX, NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP 18-21 (1964)
(authority/association);
R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOM, POLITICS. ECONOMICS AND WELFARE (1953) (price system/

hierarchy/polyarchy/bargaining) ; A. Etzioni, Toward a Macrosociology, in THEoRETICAL SOCIOLOGY 80-97 (J. McKinney & E. Tiryakian eds. 1970) (control/consensus) ; L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 233-34 (rev. ed. 1969) (horizontal/
vertical); J. MCKINNEY, CONSTRUCTIVE TYPOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY 100-15 (discussion of several typologies), 194-98 (power diffuse/power concentrated systems)
(1966). The distinction developed in economics between concentrated control ("private" or "state" ownership) and diffused control ("communal" ownership and market
allocation) of scarce goods is also useful in grasping the basis of this typology. See
1-. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. PAPERS &
PROCEEDINGS 347, 350-53 (1967) ; cf. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972) ;
Sahlins, On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange, in MODELS IN ANTHROPOLGY 141-45
(Banton, ed. 196 _).
214. It is assumed that co-ordination of behavior through mere coincidence, i.e.,
persons acting all in unison without any communication, is extremely rare.
215. See note 145 and accompanying discussion supra.
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which can be transformed into inequality in control.
The larger the group, the greater the likelihood that
there will be such inequalities.
(C-4) Social systems that rely on diffused control are limited to
groups of
(a) small size (Proposition C-3),
(b) relatively stable environments (if the environmental
change exceeds the ability of one person to process
data, a failure of regulation in some degree will result) (Propositions C-1 & C-2),
(c) relative equality in social and economic status (Proposition C-3 (c)), and
(d) some common ties mitigating goal conflict, e.g.,
family bonds. (Proposition C-3(b)).
(C-5) Where the conditions of Proposition C-4 are not satisfied,
then regulation will fail to some degree and the society
will either disintegrate to some extent (see Proposition
S-4) or the society will develop hierarchical patterns of
control, i.e., Hart's secondary rules.
Proposition C-5 avoids the problems in Hart's model because
there is no suggestion that larger, more complex societies are anything
but that, i.e., larger and more complex. Whether such societies are
more efficient in achieving a specific goal such as survival is a separate
and distinct issue. Thus, there is no potential logical inconsistency in
referring to smaller societies as "defective." Hart never specifically
discusses the relationship between size/complexity and the accomplishment of particular social goals. The development of such a question is beyond the scope of this article, but for present purposes the
points to be stressed are: first, the limits of Hart's proposition; and
second, the ways in which a general, prediction-oriented theoretical
perspective (as demonstrated by the above cybernetic principles) can
be applied to add a predictive dimension to a model of law which is
2
oriented primarily toward classification.

16

c. The content of law
The following analysis of law is divided into two parts. The first
part focuses on the standard developed by Hart for identifying the
216. Cybernetic principles also support such Hart propositions as (1) the need for
division of labor, i.e., each person specializes to deal with a particular portion of the
complexity of the environment (Proposition S-3; Proposition C-1 & C-2); and (2)
the need for individual autonomy at lower levels of decision-making hierarchies since
the higher levels are limited in their information-processing capabilities. See Proposition R-9. See note 226 and accompanying text supra.
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distinctly "legal rules" in a society. Then, the specific propositions
concerning the content are discussed.
i. The identification of "law"
In his introductory chapter Hart discusses several problems involved in attempting to define "law" :217
(1) "[T]here is no familiar, well-understood category of which
law is a member" ' and which can be used to define law by
inclusion in that category or class.
(2) Even if such classes are proposed - e.g., law is a member
of "the general family of rules of behavior" - there will be
borderline cases which render the definition problematic.
(3) Law is sufficiently complex that there are different ways
of placing it in various general classifications.
Rather than attempting to "define" law, Hart adopts the procedure
of constructing a model of law by isolating and characterizing a central
set of elements involved in analyzing jurisprudential issues.
The elements thus isolated and characterized are:
(1)

Rules (see Propositions R-2 and R-3);

(2)

The two types of rules tion R-1); and

(3)

The "rule of recognition" (Proposition R-5).

primary and secondary (Proposi-

Not all rules are legal in nature; for example, "honor thy father and
mother" is a moral and religious rule. 219 Legal rules are unique
because a developed system of law has a rule of recognition which
identifies "valid" legal rules.
This model excludes from study certain types of behavior control, such as, diffused social control by moral pressure. However, it
also includes a considerable amount of behavioral control, i.e., any
hierarchical system which makes rules and which satisfies the consensus and behavioral requirements of the rule of recognition. Such
systems include not only "governmental" legislatures, courts, and
administrative agencies but also private institutions such as unions and
large corporations. Thus, when Hart speaks of the content of law

217. HART, CONCEPT 13-16; see also H. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 LAW REv. Q. 37 (1954).
218. HART, CONCEPT 15.
219. See text accompanying notes 117-19 supra.
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99

he is referring to the content of a large number of behavioral
220
systems.
ii. The propositions concerning the content of law
The first proposition concerning content is derived from the role

of survival as a goal of all men (Proposition M-1 (b)) and the vulnerability of men to physical harm by other men (Proposition M-3

(a)). This proposition is:
(R-7) The legal rules must limit the use of deadly force. (See
Propositions M-1 (b) and M-3(a)).
Because the underlying propositions concerning men are "valid," this
proposition concerning the content of law has a certain initial appeal.
220. It might be argued that this is too broad a statement of Hart's model, but he

never presents any other criteria for limiting the model. See text accompanying notes
203-05 supra. It has been asserted that other limiting criteria are implicit in Hart's
model. For example, one writer argues that the crucial identifying characteristic of
law in Hart's system is the monopoly of coercive force. Note, Hart, Austin, and the
Concept of a Legal System: The Primacy of Sanctions, 84 YALE L.J. 584 (1975).

This assertion is based upon the combined effect of Proposition R-7 (limits on force)
and Proposition R-11 (coercive sanctions). There is a certain merit in the contention because the two propositions do tell us that, if we find a rule enforced by legitimate
coercive force, we have found a legal rule as opposed to a nonlegal rule.
However, this interpretation is not sound. Even though Hart's model is verbal
and therefore somewhat ambiguous, such a view of his model substantially distorts
the thrust of his theory. This distortion is apparent in a number of ways. First, to
the extent that the interpretation focuses on breach of rules and on extreme physical
coercion as the penalty for breach, it distorts Hart's emphasis on the distinction
between the internal attitude of "obligation" (Proposition R-2(a) (2) ; compare
Proposition 2-12) and the external phenomena of being "obliged," see HART, CONCEPT
79-88; notes 60, 163-65 and accompanying text supra. Second, it excludes from the
class of legal systems part or all of a system of rules where physical coercion is imposed by the populace at large. This again distorts Hart. HART, CONCEPT 84, 89-95,
108-09; cf. M. GLUCKMAN, POLITICs, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY 111-54
(1965); L. MAIR, PRIMITIvE GOVERNMENT 7-122 (1970); J. STONE, SOCIAL DImENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 744 (1966). A final distortion is the shift in emphasis
from the rule of recognition, which identifies the distinctly legal, to one particular

power authorized by the rule of recognition, i.e., coercive force. See Propositions
R-1 (b) (1) (D) & R-5. It is the rule of recognition that tells us we have found
legitimate, "legal" force rather than "gunman"-type, "illegal" force. See HART,
CONCEPT chs. 2-6 passim.
Even if such an interpretation of Hart were acceptable, there would still be a
large number of social control systems which are "legal." For example, any "private"
rules "recognized" and enforced by organs authorized to use force are "legal." Moreover, although Proposition R-7 limits the use of force, it does not forbid it. Any
use of force authorized by the rule of recognition or a subordinate secondary rule

would be a "legal" use of force, whether imposed by a policeman in making an arrest,
a father on a son, a husband on an adulterer, shopkeeper on shoplifter, a defender
on attacker, etc. Thus, even under a substantially distorted view of Hart's model, a
considerable amount of behavior is labeled "legal" or "official" action.
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However, implicit in this assertion is the assumption that law, i.e.,
the hierarchical system of rules unified by a rule of recognition - is
so superior to a non-hierarchical, nonunified system of rules, e.g.,
moral rules - that legal rules must be used to limit deadly force.
Without such an assumption, Hart could not go from:
In order to fulfill the function of survival of individual men
(Proposition M-1(b)), a society must impose some limit on
the use of deadly force (Proposition M-3(a));
to
This limitation on deadly force cannot be accomplished unless
the legal system is used because no other system of social control
can adequately limit deadly force.
This assumption is vital to Hart's model; yet he does not even show
an awareness of it. 22' This omission is particularly damaging to his
model because it is reflected in all of his propositions concerning the
necessary content of law.
The above content proposition (R-7) relates to the personal
"right" to be free from the threat of deadly harm to one's body. The
second content proposition provides that there must be "rights" in
nonbodily "things":
(R-8) The legal rules must contain some substantive "property"
rules governing material resources whereby:
(a) at any particular time
(b) a particular person(s) may exclude all others
(c) from a particular material resource.
As thus stated, the proposition does not give proper weight to the
fact that man is also limited in his ability to enforce rights like
"ownership" (Proposition M-3). If the "cost" (measured in terms
of limited resources) of enforcing rights exceeds the "cost" of not
enforcing rights, an efficient society (Propositions S-I, S-2 & S-3)
would not have rules establishing rights in things.222 Such a situation
221. For an example of a model which phrases the role of law in such conditional

terms, see

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LAW

(D. Black & M. Mileski eds. 1973);

R. KORN & L. McCORKLE, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 75-77 (1959). Black and
Mileski, supra at 6-7, assert:
Much empirical evidence is now available to support at least one relevant theoretical claim: law comes into play when other forms of social control are weak
or unavailable.
For a critical discussion of this proposition, see Hubbard, The "Sociology of Law:"
One View from the Lawyers' Side of the Fence, 7 RUTGERs-CAMDEN L.J. 458 (1976).
222. Cf. Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the

American West, 18 J. LAW & EcoN. 163 (1975); H. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Property Rights, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347 (1967).
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might exist where there is no actual scarcity; for example, concern
about rights to clean air and water develops only after pollution
reaches a certain level. 228 Furthermore, an efficient society would not
have legal rules allocating property rights if non-legal, social control
were effective in accomplishing this function. However, as discussed
above in connection with Proposition R-7, Hart never considers
whether a non-legal, social-control mechanism might adequately accomplish a "necessary" social function. Given these inherent limits
on the efficient and necessary use of legal rules in establishing rights
in things, it may be that a given legal system will have few, if any,
property rules. Moreover, in those systems which do have property
rules, the "cost" of enforcement will have a significant effect on the
224
specific rules adopted.
Hart not only asserts that there must be property rights in an
efficient society; he also asserts that it must be possible to exchange
these rights:
(R-9) The legal rules must contain some secondary rules which
authorize individuals:
(a) to exchange property and services, and
(b) to "contract" for future exchanges of property and/or
services.
Once again Hart assumes that no other social-control system (e.g.,
informal bargaining, enforced by "good faith" and the need to maintain the exchange relationship) 225 will accomplish this function adequately. Except for this qualification, the proposition is a valid statement concerning legal rules.2 26
The next proposition concerning the content of law is:
(R-10) The legal rules must limit the use of dishonest or deliberate misleading communications.
Given the crucial role of information and communication in any social
system (see Propositions M-3, S-1 through S-4, and C-1 through
C-5), this proposition is valid insofar as it can be shown that no
social-control system other than law fulfills this function.
223. See, e.g., M. GLUCKMAN, POLITICs, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY
123 (1965) :
Land rights, where the population does not press heavily beyond the land's
capacity, are permissive. . . . A man who first settled in a particular local area
retains a little prestige from this, but he cannot stop others following him.
224. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAxv. L. Rv. 1089 (1972).
225. See, e.g., Macaulay, Contract Law Among American Businessmen, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
226. For further support of Proposition R-9, see note 216 supra.
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The last three propositions concerning the content of rules are:
The legal system must impose sanctions for some
breaches in order to coerce behavior.
(R-12) The rules must have some minimal mutuality of content
for a significant part of society so that this segment of
society will be given an incentive for co-operation in
obeying the rules.
(R-13) Rules, particularly primary rules, must contain provisions that can in fact be obeyed.

(R-11)

Proposition R-11, although ambiguous in some respects,

sition R-13 seem
sition M-3) and
empirically valid.
tion, Proposition

22 7

and Propo-

clearly supported by Hart's model of man (Propothe relevant portion of this underlying model are
However, because of the vagueness of its formulaR-12 presents difficulties, such as :221

What is "minimal" mutuality?229

What is a "significant" portion of society ?28
Does "content" refer to all laws or only to certain types of laws,
e.g., laws relating to limits on deadly force?
Indeed, because R-12 is inherently so ambiguous that it is not
possible to determine whether it accurately describes the real world,
it can neither classify nor predict. Consequently, one using the
article would find the
metatheoretical perspective proposed in this
231
proposition to be of little functional utility.

d. Exclusions from the model
Men are limited in their ability to process information. (Proposition M-3(c)). Given this limitation, men cannot process all the information about all the "real world" all the time. A selection process
is necessary. Thus, jurisprudents must select and organize the real
227. See notes 187 & 193 supra.
228. Since I have phrased the proposition, it might be argued that the ambiguity
is mine. However, it is not possible to be more explicit than Hart, and he is very
vague here. See notes 34 & 91 supra.
229. For an example of Hart's ambiguity on this point, see discussion in note
145 supra.
230. The ambiguity of this term is reflected in the following:
[Coercive power] may be used to subdue and maintain, in a position of permanent
inferiority, a subject group whose size, relatively to the master groups, may be
large or small, depending on the means of coercion, solidarity, and discipline
available to the latter, and the helplessness or inability to organize of the former.
HART, CoNcEPT 197.

231. See text accompanying notes 8-18 supra.
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world by the use of a theory or model of law which will (1) identify
particular aspects of the world -

e.g., rules -

that are sufficiently

similar so that they can be said to form one element or unified set of
elements; (2) focus on such elements and the interrelationships
among them; and (3) exclude all other aspects of reality, in whole or
in part. 232 As exclusions are inherent in any model, criticizing Hart's
model merely because of exclusions is not sufficient. In addition, some
criteria must be developed which indicate why some particular elements should or should not have been excluded.2 33 Such tests were
developed above in the section entitled "Criteria for Evaluating
Theories, '

234

and they can now be used to discuss Hart's exclusions

and some jurisprudential criticisms of them.
Hart explicitly excludes morality from his model:
(R-14) Morality affects the content of a particular legal system
by influencing:
(a) The content of rules - both secondary and primary.
(b) The interpretation of rules in the "open-textured"
area.
(R-15) Relationships between law and morality more specific
than those identified in Proposition R-14 are culturally
determined. Thus,
(a) there is no necessary direct relationship between the
validity of a law (based on the content of the
society's "rule of recognition") and the morality or
justice of that law, and
(b) there is no necessary direct relationship between
morality and content of laws. (Compare Propositions R-7 through R-12).
This exclusion is based on the assertion in Proposition M-3(c) that
survival is the only goal common to all men. Since there are no
other common goals, Hart argues that the structure and content of
a model of law need not go beyond the boundaries established by
Propositions R-1 through R-13.
However, if there are other common goals such as providing
minimal health care, furthering education, or protecting aesthetic
values,23 5 then it might be necessary to develop additional propositions.
232. See

HART, CONCEPT

LAW. Q. REv. 37, 42 (1954).

13-17; Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,70
For further authority on the use of models, see note

107 supra.
233. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
234. See text accompanying notes 14-18 supra.
235. See notes 132-35 and accompanying text supra.
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Moreover, even if survival is the only common goal, at least one other
proposition concerning content would seem justifiable. The costly
legal apparatus contemplated by Propositions S-3, R-1(b), R-5, and
R-6 necessitates some rules to allocate the costs of supporting this
system. 236 Thus, even if one accepts Hart's view that only functionally necessary elements should be included in a model of law, his
model appears incomplete.
In order to illustrate the utility of the proposed metatheory,
this article will consider conventional jurisprudential criticisms of the
exclusions of Hart's model. In particular, attention will focus on
Hart's exclusion of any non-rule elements which shape the exercise
of the powers granted by a secondary rule and on two critics - of
this exclusion - Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller.
i. Ronald Dworkin
One instance of the exercise of powers under secondary rules is
a court's conduct in deciding a case. For example, a court has the
power to interpret and apply a rule within the open-textured area.
Moreover, courts often have the power to change rules. If one seeks
to "predict" the decision of a court (which Hart does not), 23 7 then

the aspects of the real world which affect that decision are of interest.
Since rules are only one such aspect, a model which included only
rules would not be equipped to accomplish a predictive function. But
the designer of a predictive model of courts faces the problem that
the variables which influence a judge's decision - e.g., his social
"class," educational background, and "mood" - are so myriad that
23 8
no manageable model could include them all.

Ronald Dworkin has developed a "predictive" model of judicial
behavior which is broader than rules alone but not so broad that
it includes all the aspects of the "real world." Dworkin's model is
limited to the "formal" aspects of decision, i.e., the elements which
courts formally declare to be involved in their determination. 239 Ob236. See E. HoEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN 233 (1954). Various mechanisms can be used: fines, fees, "taxes," "public" ownership of productive goods, etc.
But there must be some such mechanism.
237. See text accompanying notes 64-65 & 179 supra.
238. See, e.g., S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE
(1969); JUDICIAL DECISION-MAXING (G. Schubert ed. 1963); Schubert, Behavioral
Jurisprudence, 11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 407 (1968).
239. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHr. L. REv. 14 (1967). Dworkin's
article is designed to "examine the soundness of positivism, particularly in the powerful
form that Professor H.L.A. Hart of Oxford has given to it." Id. at 17. Dworkin
criticizes Hart's model as unsound because it excludes some aspects of "reality," yet
Dworkin never offers any basis for identifying valid exclusions. As a consequence, it
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viously, rules are one such elerfhent. In addition to rules though, there
are also "principles" which formally guide decision in the open-textured
area and which shape the formulation of new rules.24 ° Principles are
logically distinct from rules in that :241
(1) Rules are an all-or-none proposition: they apply or they
do not; and if they apply, they determine the decision. Principles, however, may be applicable but may not determine
the decision. For example, the principle that no man should
profit from his own wrong is nearly always applicable to
wrongdoers, but it does not necessarily determine judicial
decision in adverse possession cases.
(2)

Rather than apply in all-or-none fashion, principles have a
dimension that rules do not - weight or importance. Thus,
when two applicable principles conflict in a given case, both
are still valid and applicable (contrasted with rules where
one would yield and become invalid or inapplicable). However, the principle which is more important in the particular
case would prevail.

Based on this definition of priniciples, Dworkin criticizes Hart and
the other legal positivists for excluding principles from their models
of law. 42
Underlying this criticism, however, are two theoretical premises
which Dworkin never develops:
(1) That the analysis or prediction of decision, particularly
judicial decision, is the function of the model; and
(2)

That there are legitimate criteria for excluding "informal"
aspects of decision (e.g., the judge's personal values and
prejudices) while including the "formal" elements of rules
and principles in the model of judicial decision.

These premises may be acceptable. However, until jurisprudents confront such underlying premises openly, we will never get past the
point where A constructs a theory to accomplish X function, B
criticizes the theory because it does not satisfy Y function, and the
underlying comparison of X function and Y function is ignored.

is necessary to infer some test of "proper" exclusions. Because principles could be
used to predict decision, Dworkin's model is viewed here as a predictive one and
the predictive function is used as the basis for a functioned evaluation of the validity

of exclusions.
240. Id. at 22-46.
241. Id. at 22-29.
242. Id. at 29-46.
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ii. Lon Fuller
Lon Fuller has recognized the importance of these underlying
theoretical premises. Hart and Fuller have been engaged in debate
(or non-debate depending on one's analysis of points of actual disagreement 243) over the proper analysis of jurisprudential issues for
years. 244 In the latest installment in this exchange Fuller notes that:
As critical reviews of my book [The Morality of Law] came in,
I myself became increasingly aware of the extent to which the
debate did indeed depend on "starting points" - not on what
the disputants said, but on what they considered it unnecessary to
say, not on articulated principles but on tacit assumptions. What
was needed therefore, it seemed to me, was to bring these tacit
assumptions to more 2adequate
expression than either side has
45
so far been able to do.
While he develops a number of assumptions, Fuller asserts that two
are particularly relevant to the exclusion of morality from Hart's
model of law:
[I] perceive two assumptions underlying my critics' rejection of
"the internal morality of law." The first of these is a belief that
the existence or nonexistence of law is, from a moral point of
view, a matter of indifference. The second is an assumption I
have already described as characteristic of legal positivism generally. This is the assumption that law should be viewed not as
the product of an interplay of purposive orientations between
the citizen and his government but as a one-way projection of
authority, originating
with government and imposing itself upon
246
the citizen.
Unfortunately, the exact nature of these "assumptions" and of Fuller's
criticisms of them is unclear.
Hart's first "assumption" cannot be that law and morality are
unrelated because Proposition R-14 explicitly recognizes that morality influences law. Moreover, Hart also notes that "the law of
some societies has occasionally been in advance of the accepted
morality ... ;,,147 and that "the enactment or repeal of laws may well
243. See, e.g., Hughes, Rules, Policy, and Decision Making, 77

YALE

L.J.

411 (1968).
244. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV.
593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - a Reply to Professor Hart,
71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958); HART, CONCEPT 202; L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 95-151, 184-86 (1964); Hart, Book Review, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1965);
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 187-242 (rev. ed. 1969).
245. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 189 (rev. ed. 1969).
246. Id. at 204.
247. HART, CONCEPT 196.
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be among the causes of the change or decay of some moral standard . .. *"24 Thus, Hart concedes that there is a two-way interchange
between the moral system and the legal system. However, his point
is that there are two distinct systems which can and should be analyzed
separately. 249 (Proposition R-15). This analytical distinction is not
a "tacit assumption" of Hart; it is part of the core of his model.
Fuller's criticism then must be that such an analytical distinction is
"invalid." However, he never offers any criterion of "validity" to use
in evaluating such conceptual classifications.2 50
The nature of the second "assumption" identified by Fuller
the one-way projection of authority in a hierarchical fashion - is also
unclear. Hart recognizes that law is the "product of an interplay of
purposive orientations between the citizen and his government' '251 in
numerous ways:

(1) The rule of recognition requires at least general acquiescence
by citizens (Proposition R-5 (a) (1)), and this acquiescence
requires that mutual protection be extended to a significant
portion of society. (Proposition R-12).
(2) Rules must be viewed from the perspective of those affected
by them. (Proposition R-2(a) (2)).
(3) Hart's model of society is functional or purposive (Propositions S-1 through S-4) and he views law as having a
role in accomplishing social functions. (Propositions R-1
through R-13).
(4) The legal system is most efficient when it enables individuals
to accomplish certain purposes. (Proposition R-9).
(5) Moral views of "proper" law influence the content of "positive" law, i.e., rules enacted pursuant to the rule of recognition. (Proposition R-14).
As with the first "tacit assumption," Fuller seems to use some implicit
criterion of validity to determine that the purposive interplay between
law and citizens is somehow so underemphasized by Hart that the
resulting model is invalid.
248. Id. at 172. Similarly, Hart has stated:
No doubt it is true that if deviations from conventional sexual morality are
tolerated by the law and come to be known, the conventional morality might
change in a permissive direction,...

H.

(1963).
249. See text accompanying notes 117-20 supra; Hart, Concept 172, where he
argues that the interchange has no pattern, i.e., law may or may not effect a change
in morality.
250. Hart is subject to the same criticism. See text accompanying notes 23-32,
188 & 193 supra.
251. L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 204 (rev. ed. 1969).
HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 52
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An obvious lesson of this very brief examination of Fuller's
criticisms is that one cannot evaluate a classification model of law
without first developing a metatheoretical test for the "validity" of
the analytical boundaries used in such a model. 22 Fuller, in discussing both of the underlying assumptions quoted above, did not
develop any such criterion. Consequently, he can only say that
Hart's model is inadequate because it does not include the elements
which Fuller would include.2 13 The debate thus stagnates at the level
of "one man's theory . ..

."

A second lesson .to be learned from this consideration of Fuller's
criticism is the need to develop more explicit, formal models of law.
If Fuller and Hart had used such a methodology, there would be less
need to analyze their :"interpretations" of each other and more opportunity to focus on areas of actual disagreement.
iii. Conclusion
A model has a "boundary" between included and excluded elements :254 (1) Hart 'places that boundary around rules alone; (2)
Dworkin would extend it to include "principles"; and (3) Fuller
would extend it in a somewhat different manner to include morality
and an increased emphasis on "purpose. 2 5 5" The fundamental issue,
therefore, is how does one define the boundaries of one's model. Consequently, while it is important to note these boundaries and relevant
interchanges across boundaries, it is also important to develop criteria
for comparing models based on different boundaries.
252. See text accompanying notes 19, 23-32, 188, 193 & 250 supra.
253. See quote in text accompanying note 246 supra. Note Fuller's reference to
how law "should be viewed."
254. See text accompanying notes 232-34 supra.
255. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969):
[T]he attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may miscarry in at
least eight ways; there are in this enterprise if you will, eight distinct routes to
disaster. The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so
that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2)
a failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules
he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only
cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect,
since it puts them under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make
rules understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that
require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) introducing such
frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them;
and finally, (8) a failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their
actual administration.
A total failure in any one of these eight directions does not simply result in a
bad system of law; -it results in something that is not properly called a legal
system at all . ...
Id. at 38-39 (emphasis added).
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The functional test discussed above provides such a criterion. If,
for -example, one is concerned with assisting and training people who
exercise secondary powers (one function performed by American law
professors like Fuller), 25 6 then Fuller's theory is superior to Hart's
because Hart excludes more elements relevant to such tasks than
does Fuller.25 7 Thus, Fuller and Dworkin could devise functional tests
and Hart's model would be incomplete in terms of those particular
tests.
However, it should be noted that this does not mean that Hart's
model is "wrong" or "invalid"; it is only incomplete relative to some
functions. To a considerable degree Hart's model satisfies the function for which he designed it - the organization and classification of
legal phenomena in diverse societies. The model of law-as-rules organizes in two ways. First, it can organize Dworkin's and Fuller's
arguments by translating their criticisms into one model with minimal
change in their positions. 258 Second, the translation process sheds
256. Fuller explicitly adopted such a functional perspective in The Law in Quest
of Itself:
Though there are no doubt many permissible ways of defining the function of
legal philosophy, I think the most useful is that which conceives of it as attempting to give a profitable and satisfying direction to the application of human energies
in the law. Viewed in this light, the task of the legal philosopher is to decide how
he and his fellow lawyers may best spend their professional lives. In keeping
with this pragmatic conception, we may test the reality of any particular controversy of legal philosophy by asking: Would the adoption of the one view or the
other affect the way in which the judge, the lawyer, the law teacher, or the law
student, spends his working day?
L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 2-3 (1940).
257. E.g., Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 77 YALE L.J. 411 (1968)
[I]t is true that the law can in some fashion be reduced to a body of rules, as
indeed happens with collected editions of the statutes or with such works as the
Restatement. But every law student quickly discovers (if he ever thought to the
contrary) that he does not come to a law school to learn the content of these
volumes, and it is a familiar clich6 that no lawyer can know very much of the
law. The tasks of law teaching are to impart sophistication in techniques of arguments and reasoning. For this purpose, and for the elucidation of a legal system,
we must add to the concepts of duty-imposing and power-conferring rules the
notion of canons or standards of interpretation which serve more than one purpose.
Id. at 436-37 (emphasis added). See Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective
of Legal Realism, 61 CoLuM. L. Rxv. 799 (1961) :
When we enter the realm of the judge's "serious business," the prosecutor's discretion, the practicing lawyer's choices, we need a moral theory fully as demanding as the older natural law tradition but more directly addressed to the points
of strain at which moral insights are most needed. In realist perspective, choice,
decision, and responsibility for decision are central elements for a philosophy of law.
Id. at 809.
258. Dworkin has explicitly rejected attempts to "reconcile" his model with Hart's.
Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855, 868-74 (1972). Dworkin's

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

considerable light on the work of Dworkin and Fuller by indicating
the exact thrust of their criticisms. In this manner, Hart's model
can assist in developing a model which is more complete in terms of a
particular function.
In short, exclusions from a model are a very relative matter.
From one functional perspective, particular exclusions can constitute a
fatal flaw. Yet, from another viewpoint limiting the model by exclusion can be very helpful in simplifying and organizing analysis. The
main point from a metatheoretic perspective is that jurisprudents
should focus less on the criticism of mere exclusions from models and
more on a close analysis of the underlying tests for exclusions. The
time has come to develop a metatheory or a "model of jurisprudence"
which provides criteria for evaluating the "boundary" decisions in a
particular model of law.
IV.

CONCLUSION -

A

MODEL OF JURISPRUDENCE

Jurisprudence has not developed a metatheory and this neglect
has fostered a subjective morass in which "one man's theory . .. ."
has been contrasted with another's with only minimal co-operative
development of a science of law. To help solve the problem, this
article has proposed a metatheoretic perspective and has illustrated
that perspective by analyzing Hart's model. It has been emphasized
throughout that the primary purpose of this analysis has been to
develop and illustrate the proposed metatheory, not to provide yet
another summary of Hart's views. To provide a sharp and final focus
on metatheory and jurisprudence, this conclusion will sketch a provisional "model of jurisprudence" by employing the same propositional
method of model construction used in formalizing Hart's legal theory.
The first elements in a model of jurisprudence are:
(J-1)

Jurisprudence is a human activity; therefore, it requires
an underlying model of man.

(J-2)

Jurisprudence is a social activity; therefore, it requires
an underlying model of social activity.

objections to Hart are similar in some respects to those discussed in this article's
critical analysis of the rule of recognition. See text accompanying notes 238-42 supra.
But in the above cited article Dworkin goes beyond the present article and interprets
Hart's rule of recognition in an extremely restricted manner. A complete resolution
of this new aspect of their disagreement is beyond the scope of this article. However,
the point should be made that this debate (or nondebate) results largely from the use
of ambiguous verbal models which have been used too often. Compare the formal
model of the rule of recognition presented in APPENDIX 2.
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If Hart's models of men and society are adopted, then the following
propositions emerge:
(J-3) Jurisprudence requires "rules"2'59 to co-ordinate its activities. 260

(Compare Proposition R-4).

(J-4) Jurisprudence requires a system of rules to co-ordinate
its activities.2 61

(Compare Proposition R-5).

(J-5)

Jurisprudence will be more "efficient" if it has secondary
rules.262

(J-6)

The ability of jurisprudence to process data is limited by
man's inherent ability to process information (Proposition M-3 (c)) and by the quality and quantity of the
other resources available to support such data-processing
(Proposition M-3(e)). Therefore, some jurisprudential
rules must address the allocation of these resources.
(Compare Proposition R-8).

The above propositions would apply to any system of jurisprudence. However, as participants in a particular system of jurisprudence, we are not indifferent to the specific content of our system.
Thus, we must go beyond "jurisprudential positivism" and develop
some concepts regarding the "proper" content of our particular jurisprudence. For example, this article has proposed the following specific
rules:
(J-7)

The "validity" of theories can be tested by a functional
approach.
(J-8) Theoretical functions can be ranked as follows:
(a) Classification (the lowest functional ranking),
(b) Prediction, and
(c) Technological control.

259. We could provisionally accept Hart's definition of a rule. See Propositions
R-2 and R-3.
260. Our jurisprudence has many "rules." For example,
(1) Theories should be internally consistent.
(2) Theories presented in American law reviews will use the form of
citation and abbreviation prescribed in (HARVARD LAW REvIEw
Ass'N) A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (11th ed. 1967).
(3) There are certain secondary rules which confer "power"; for example,
(a) Publishers and editors have the power to determine which
theories are communicated.
(b) Academic faculties have the power to determine who will be
a jurisprudent since this is primarily an academic task.
261. Our jurisprudence is extremely primitive in this regard. See text accompanying note 1 supra and notes 267-68 infra.
262. See notes 260-61 supra.
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(J-9) The methodology of constructing the theory should be as
unambiguous as possible; therefore, models should be as
explicit and2 63formal as the state of theoretical development
will allow.

(J-10) One of the tasks of jurisprudence is the examination of
law in terms of morality and justice. (This does not mean
that "positivism" is excluded from jurisprudence or that
a particular model could not exclude morality and justice.
Instead it means that more than positivism will be studied
in our jurisprudence and that some models will include
morality and justice.)
(J-11) Theoretical issues should be selected with the following in
mind:
(a) The ability to "test" for satisfaction of the theoretical
function (Proposition J-7),
(b) The "rank" of the function (Proposition J-8),
(c) The ability to construct a relatively unambiguous
model (See Proposition J-9), and
2
(d) The importance of the issue to mankind " (Proposition J-10).
An empirical investigation of our jurisprudential system indicates that there are some rules, both primary and secondary. 265 However, none are unified in any formal manner and the secondary rules
are rare and primitive. 266 Consequently, our jurisprudence remains
28 7
characterized by a situation like Hart's primitive legal system.
For example, since we lack the fundamental jurisprudential rules required by Propositions J-3 and J-5, each jurisprudent is individualistic
and intuitive. As a result, men like Hart, Dworkin, and Fuller, who
under present standards268 are regarded as jurisprudential geniuses,
are individualistic genuises; their models lack criteria of comparability
with other models. Moreover, they are intuitive genuises; their insights are more the result of pure intellect than of conscious methodology. Unfortunately, however, the strengths of these men reflect
the weaknesses of our primitive jurisprudential "theory of theory."
This article has proposed a metatheory which would provide
criteria of comparison and foster the use and development of explicit
methodologies. Even if one disagrees with the particular metatheory
263. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.

264. See text accompanying notes 8 and 108-20 supra.
265. See note 260 supra.
266. See note 260 and accompanying discussion supra.

267. See notes 260-61 and accompanying discussion supra; HART,
268. Cf. notes 260-61 and accompanying discussion supra.

CoNcEPT

89-96.
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proposed, it seems clear that jurisprudence must focus more on metatheoretical issues and on the development of some metatheoretical perspective. Such a metatheory would be the foundation for explicit,
objectively comparable models which would facilitate co-operative
efforts and enable lesser persons to make substantial contributions.
It is only in this way that jurisprudence can go beyond "one man's
theory . . . ." and move toward the status of a science, which is a
"discipline in which the fool of this generation can go beyond the
point reached by the genius of the last generation." 6 ' When this
is done, perhaps we will have found another of the elusive "keys to the
science of jurisprudence."
269. M.

GLUCKMAN, POLITIcs, LAW AND RITUAL IN

TRAL

Socn'Ty 60 (1965).
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APPENDIX 1
FORMALIZATION

I.

OF

HART'S MODELS

IN

PROPOSITION

FORM

Model of Man
(M-1)

Man is purposive or goal-oriented.
(a) Specific goals vary from individual to individual and
from time to time, but all men are goal-oriented.
(b) Virtually all men have the goal of survival which is
an equilibrium state called "life."
(c) There are no other goals common to nearly all men.

(M-2)

Man is "rational" or "efficient" (more or less).

(M-3)

Men are relatively equal in that they have common limits
on:
(a) their ability to protect themselves,
(b) their inclination to act altruistically,
(c) their ability to process information,
(d) their longevity,
(e) the material resources available to them for accomplishing goals, and
(f) their physical abilities.

(M-4)

Man is uniquely capable of recognizing from an internal
perspective the "binding" nature of certain standards.

II. Model of Society
(S-1) Social effort is more "efficient" than individual effort.
(S-2) Dynamic societies are more "efficient" than static societies.
(S-3) Societies with a division or specialization of labor are more
"efficient" than societies where all men do the same work.
Therefore, societies with "legal specialists" ("officials") are
more "efficient" than societies without "officials."
(S-4) Societies require a certain minimum level of "order" or coordination.
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III. Model of Law
A. The Nature of Rules
(R-1) Rules can be divided into two basic types:
(a) Primary rules which dictate certain behavior patterns and
which usually, but not necessarily, provide that sanctions
will be imposed for breach of the rule.
(b)

Secondary rules, which
(1) confer "power":
(A)

to create primary rules or subordinate secondary rules;

(B)

to interpret primary rules;

(C)

to apply primary rules to facts; and,

(D)

to apply sanctions for breach of primary rules;
and,

(2) nullify the attempted exercise of power if the rule is
not followed.
(R-2) A rule:
(a) Requires:
(1) A "communication" of a prescribed standard of conduct. (See Proposition R-3(a) below), and
(2) An internal attitude manifested as an awareness of
the "binding" nature of the standard.
(b) Is usually (but not always) accompanied by a pattern of
behavior in conformity with the rule. (However, see
Proposition R-5 below).
(c) Deals with breach of the rule as follows:
(1) The formal declaration
(A)

of a primary rule will usually (but not always)
provide a penalty for breach;

(B)

of a secondary rule will always provide that a
breach results in nullity.

(2) The actual enforcement for breach of rules will
usually (but not always) conform with the declaration.
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(R-3) The symbolic component of a rule will
(a) Usually be communicated
(1) to those affected,
(2) prior to the conduct involved, and
(3) in a form
(A) that is intelligible to those affected; and
(B)

that refers to general classes of persons and
conduct.

(b) Always be "open textured," i.e., of the set of "possible
behavior" there will be three subsets:
(1) a "closed" subset of behavior which is clearly included:
(2) a "closed" subset of behavior which is clearly excluded;
(3) an "open" subset of
included or excluded.
tion R-3(a) (2), (3)
Propositions M-3(c)

behavior which is not clearly
(This conflicts with Proposi(A), but is necessitated by
and R-3(a) (3) (B)).

B. Formal Structure of Rules and Legal Systems in Society
(R-4) Societies must have rules.
(R-5) Legal rules are unified into a system by a "rule of recognition"
which is a type of secondary rule authorizing certain persons
("officials") to exercise various powers in a consistent, systematic manner. (See Proposition R-1 (b)).
(a) The rule of recognition has two dimensions:
(1) A minimal level of obedience by citizens to the rules
promulgated by the "officials" identified by the rule;
and
(2) A shared acceptance by the "officials" of the rule of
recognition. Such "acceptance" is manifested by
(A) a minimal level of obedience to the rule of
recognition in exercising their power under the
rule,
(B)

an internal awareness of the binding nature of
rule, and

(C)

external references to the rule.

1976]

METATHEORY

117

(b) The rule of recognition is developed over time as the
above pattern of obedience and acceptance manifests
itself. Therefore,
(1)

it can only be identified retrospectively, and

(2) changes over a short period of time do not affect it.
(R-6) Secondary rules make it possible for society to be dynamic
and to have legal "officials" (Proposition R-1). Therefore,
societies with such rules are more "efficient" than societies
without them. (Propositions S-2, S-3).
C. The Content of Law
(R-7) The legal rules must limit the use of deadly force.
Propositions M-1(b), M-3 (a)).

(See

(R-8) The legal rules must contain some substantive "property"
rules governing material resources whereby:
(a) at any particular time
(b) a particular person(s) may exclude all others
(c) from a particular material resource.
(R-9) The legal rules must contain some secondary rules which
authorize individuals:
(a) to exchange property and services, and
(b) to "contract" for future exchanges of property and/or
services.
(R-10) The legal rules must limit the use of dishonest or deliberately
misleading communications.
(R-11) The legal system must impose sanctions for some breaches in
order to coerce behavior.
(R-12) The rules must have some minimal mutuality of content for
a significant part of society so this segment of society will be
given an incentive for co-operation in obeying the rules.
(R-13) Rules, particularly primary rules, must contain provisions
that can in fact be obeyed.
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D. Law as Rules and Morality
(R-14) Morality affects the content of a particular legal system by
influencing:
(a) The content of rules -

both secondary and primary.

(b) The interpretation of rules in the "open-textured" area.
(R-15) Relationships between law and morality more specific than
those identified in Proposition R-14 are culturally determined.
Thus,
(a) There is no necessary, direct relationship between the
validity of a law (based on the content of the society's
"rule of recognition") and the morality or justice of that
law; and,
(b) There is no necessary, direct relationship between morality
and content of laws. (Compare Propositions R-7 through
R-12).

APPENDIX 2
FURTHER

FORMALIZATION

OF

HART'S RULE

OF

RECOGNITION

This article argues for increased precision in the construction of
jurisprudential models. APPENDIX 1 uses a proposition method to
construct a more precise model than the one Hart developed using conventional verbal methodology. The present Appendix demonstrates how
the formalization process can be carried even further by presenting a more
explicit statement of part of the "rule of recognition" than that given in
Proposition R-5(a) (1).
This increased precision is presented in the form of a computeroriented flow-chart which illustrates, step-by-step, one possible method
of determining the content of a society's rule of recognition. Since the
purpose of this presentation is illustrative, the flow-chart examines only
the behavior of citizens in response to rule-making by officials (Proposition
R-5 (a) (1)). Omitted are the steps involved in examining citizen response to the exercise of other official powers, in determining consistency,
and in investigating "acceptance" of the rule of recognition by officials.
A flow-chart is used because it is a precise method of presentation, because a computer would be needed to process the large amounts of data
involved, and because this method of explicit formalization is easier to

understand than, for example, a mathematical model.
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In order for computer novices to follow the flow-chart, it might be
helpful to point out certain basic symbolic conventions used in writing
computer programs:
(1) Arrows indicate the order in which the analytical steps are
undertaken.
(2) Boxes are used-to indicate analytical units. Arranged sequentially
they indicate the steps in analysis:

Give
some
Give
some

a variable
value
the variable
new value

|

Compare the variable with a
standard. The truth (T) or
falsity (F) of the-comparison
indicates which exit is taken.

Give a varial
some value

Compare a variable with a standard.
The Truth (T) or falsity (F) of
the comparison indicates which
exi t is taken.

(3) Subscripted variables are often used to direct the computer.
For example, if there are ten discrete units of time involved,
then the subscript a (Ta) in Step I has the value of 10.
The lower case variable "j" controls the computer by starting
at time unit one (j --1), increasing by one each time the
examination of a unit of time is completed (j
j + 1), and
"telling" the computer to move to the next step when 10 units
of time have been examined, i.e., when (j " a) is false.

120
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FLOW CImART

DESCRIPTION

Start

I

For each unit (T) in time
..
TT
TT) 270
1

Look at each type ofT
official (0) (01.02,
0 271
21kk

III

IV

T.

O
F

k
k!B

And each 272 individual
official of each tye
(OlI
2. .
.. .0k)

1

Time

i=

1 1

p

Individual Official 0
k-

2/

And each 22rule 27 R)
promulgated by each
official (RI , R2 ... ,RD)

mlM
m=m.1

DF

Rl

T
y=0
Z=O

V

VI

And the behavior of
individual citizens 274
in response to each
1
r27I ., IE)

I
n=lIndividual behavior

To deteraine2 75
if the rule
was "obeyed',
(OR) byT
each individual citizen.
T

VII

In = OB

Keep track of results
(y=OB, z =

OB)

VIII Determine by some standard
whether the rule is obeyed

(e.g.

IX

y -z)

Store results (obeyed=l;
not obeyed=0) (aee below
for storage)

Analysis

P of 0
at T. >00

R of"(k
atj

4

See
discussion
below

270. Selection of discrete units or points in a continuum like time will require some
sampling and aggregation of data. See note 107 supra.
271. What is an "official"? See notes 53, 92, 204, 220 supra.
272. A representative sample could be used.
273. Determining what constitutes a distinct individual rule could present problems.
See note 258 supra. See Funk, Pure Jurimetrics: The Measurement of Law in
Decision-Regulations, 34 U. PiTT. L. REV. 375 (1973) ; Raz, Legal Principles and the
Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 825-29 (1972).
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The various results from the preceding nine steps would be stored
in Step IX on the basis of the following diagram:

TA

T T3

e

0

1

1

11

0i

1*_________

1

___

R01R
5

R R 2R3

274. The assumption here is that all citizens count equally in determining obedience. However, this is admittedly a questionable simplification because it is not
clear whether a rule should be regarded as obeyed if three citizens - Doe, Roe, and
Moe - are affected by a rule covering an act, and if:
(1) Doe undertakes the act once and follows the rule;
(2) Roe undertakes the act once and follows the rule; and
(3) Moe undertakes the act one hundred times and never follows the rule.
275. What does "obey" mean? Problems such as defining classes of persons and
"behaviors" "affected" by rule, see note 95 supra, and dealing with degrees of compliance would have to be resolved to make the test workable. For example,
If the SEC places restrictions on the sale of stock, is an individual "affected"
if he never sells stock?
How does one determine whether a citizen's behavior would not have been the
same without the rule?
If a citizen obeys the rule sometimes and disobeys it at others, when (if ever)
can we say that he obeys it?
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With these arrays of data for each type of official (Ok), various conclusions could be drawn in Step X. For example:
(1) A pattern of nonobedience to all "officials" of a particular type
would suggest that their rules are no longer valid and that their
delegation of "official" status from the RoR is no longer in effect.
(2) One might determine that R 2 of Ok 5 is generally obeyed from
T6 to T, but has shown a decline since then. Over the same time
period other rules of Ok 5 have been generally obeyed. Since other
ru'es of Ok5 are obeyed, he is still an official. R 2 is valid even though
not obeyed if citizens obey rules similar to R 2 which are issued either
by Ok5 or by other officials of the type Ok; otherwise R 2 is invalid
because the behavior of the citizens
indicates that Ok 5 no longer has
27 6
the power to make such rules.

Even with these arrays of data there will be problems. Borderline
cases where the evidence does not clearly indicate obedience or nonobedience will present difficulties. Another problem will be in distinguishing between a shift in the RoR and a shift in "delegation" by a lower-order
secondary rule to a subordinate by a superior "official" whose status is
derived from the RoR. For example, the failure to obey the order of an
inferior court could result either from a change in the legislation establishing the court (a lower-order secondary rule) or from a change in
that part of the RoR which authorizes the legislature to establish such
courts.
Despite such difficulties the gains from a precise statement of the
rule of recognition are considerable. For example, dispute over "what"
Hart said is diminished. Unfortunately, it is not eliminated: Hart is still
ambiguous. Indeed, the identification of these ambiguities is one of the
benefits derived from formalizing his model. 277 (See footnotes to flow
chart for examples of such identification). This increased precision also
clarifies the steps necessary to gather, classify and manipulate the relevant
empirical data. This clarification facilitates not only the implementation
of these steps but also the initial determination of whether they are
278

worthwhile.

276. See HART, CONCEPT 100.

277. For examples of such identification see notes 273-75 supra.
278. See text accompanying notes 204-06 supra.

